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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In 1998 the people of Scotland elected their first parliament in over 300 years.
The establishment of this new parliament was based on the results of a referendum that
took place the year before. The referendum was part of the Scotland Act, which was
initiated by New Labour under its leader Tony Blair who came to power in 1997.
The existence of a parliament for the people of Scotland did not come
overnight. That the Scots have a devolved body in which they can now decide certain
areas of policy on their own, is based on a historical process. The aim of this thesis is
to examine this process that has finally resulted in the establishment of the Scottish
parliament. The rise of a demand for a change in the constitutional status quo led to
specific political events in the late 1990s. Areas to be considered include: Where did
this change come from? Why was there suddenly a demand for a parliament? Why are
some voices going even further and claiming that Scotland needs to become
independent?
In analyzing these questions it will be seen that there has been an
intensification of national identity in Scotland over the past decades which was
instrumental in encouraging these changes. This Scottish identity, which sets itself
apart from the identity of the nation-state of Britain, has risen over time to such an
extent that a political response became essential. But this brings then further questions:
Why did the identity rise? What were the factors involved in that process?
The first chapter of this work examines federalism and devolution in the
United Kingdom, its historical relevance and the understanding of it from a
contemporary perspective.
Following that, there is the need to stay in theory and to find a definition of
national identity; a term which needs to be examined. It takes a look at the theory
behind identity in which nations like Scotland define themselves and how national
identity arises. The chapter of the territorial dimension of the United Kingdom is also
part of the theory chapter, even though it itself is not classic theory. It examines the
territorial dimension of the United Kingdom. A closer look explains the differences
between Great Britain and the United Kingdom. It also examines the overall political
set-up of the British state and the nations within the state, as well as the national
identities which currently exist in the United Kingdom.
The rise of national identity will build the body of this work. As the word ‘rise’
already implies, this is a time-wise process, therefore the thesis will be structured
chronologically, albeit, with occasional overlapping of processes. It takes a brief look
at the weak sense of a Scottish identity up until the 1960s, and the reasons behind its
weakness.
As the Scottish National Party presents itself for the first time on the national
stage, the section following is concerned with an examination of that party. The SNP
played a huge role in the whole process, and so it is necessary to examine its history,
its electorate and its policies.
The Consensus Politics in the 1950s up until the late 1970s is a chapter
that
examines the questions; what was Consensus and which roles did the
two parties play?
What were the main ingredients of policy-making at that time?
The rise of national identity after the late 1960s started to change the overall
understanding of the Union. This, obviously, started out on a small scale, but was
nevertheless the foundation of the rise in identity. At that time, some Scottish people
started for the first time to question the concept on which Great Britain and the United
Kingdom was built. Various factors which occurred within Scotland, but also within
Britain at this time, led to an increase of doubt by the Scots that the national
understanding of Scotland’s role can, or even must be viewed differently within the
United Kingdom than it had been hitherto. The question is; what were these factors
and why did they have an impact?
In the late 1970s the Scottish people had the opportunity to address whether
they wanted their own parliament through a referendum. The referendum of 1979
failed and the constitutional set-up remained in the years to come. In that section the
political impact of the failed referendum is examined.
In 1979 the British electorate gave power to govern the country to a
Conservative government. This chapter will examine the impact of over sixteen years
of Tories rule on Scotland. The first eleven of these sixteen years Prime Minister
Thatcher headed the British government. Margaret Thatcher proved to have made a
lasting impression on the Scottish people and will therefore be discussed at length.
What does ‘Thatcherism’ mean and what policies are meant by this term? How did the
Scottish people, on the receiving end, live with Thatcher and her politics? An
individual chapter is dedicated to an event of taxation-policy, which can be seen as
symbolic for ‘Thatcherism’; the poll tax. This chapter can also be viewed as
an
example of why there was a solid reason for an increase in a Scottish national identity.
Following Thatcher, John Major took over and was Prime Minister in the first half of
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the 1990s. With a brief look, it examines the question: Did the Conservatives change
their policies for Scotland under John Major?
After the referendum of 1979, which did not receive enough votes for the
establishment of a parliament, several committed Scots who believed the idea for
devolution should not be over, started out with a Campaign for a Scottish Assembly in
1980. This process occurred despite the fact that the governing Conservatives did not
participate in the meetings. At its beginning, the Campaign, which in 1990s renamed
itself the Scottish Constitutional Convention, did not receive a lot of public attention,
but proved to have in the years to come a great impact on the Scottish people and in
their belief that devolution would be feasible. Then, the question will be examined
why the referendum in 1979 failed and the one in 1997 did not.
At the end of the thesis, the chapter “National Identities in Numbers” examines
the national identity of the Scottish, but also the British people from various
perspectives and tries to shape the whole picture based on election and other surveys
and present them statistically. The questions here are; How did the national identity in
Scotland change over the years? Where are the main differences between Scotland and
Britain in terms of self-identity? What role do political parties play in national
identity?
Before the Conclusions, this thesis provides the election results of the 1998
election to the Scottish Parliament.
CHAPTER 2
THEORY
2.1. Federalism
Constitutions seek to create an order in which the state governs itself and
countries have over time introduced various forms of government. One form of
governance is federalism, which includes two levels of government, each one having
individual responsibilities of policies which are usually based on the Constitution. The
reasons for obtaining a system of federalism vary, as federalism may satisfy various
purposes. The overall notion would be “diversity through unity,” as Smith puts it.' In
concrete terms, the reasons include territorial dimensions (which in the contemporary
world is less of an issue with modern transport and communication means); ethnic
diversity in a given country, split up into regional parts; or judicial/ political reasons,
to offer the citizen a protection from only one level of government; or a combination
of these reasons.
The spectrum of federalism, however, include in the wider range also the terms
of ‘confederalism’ on the one hand and ‘devolution’ on the other. Confederalism
occurs when polities join under a common, but weak sort of government, whose aim it
is to make policies in their common interest, e.g. monetary policies or defense. The
Commonwealth of Independent States or the European Union can be seen as examples
of a confederalist system. A system of devolution differs from federalism and
confederalism in regard of the devolved level. In devolution the devolved
body is
given a certain range of policy areas. The central government decides
which areas of
‘ Graham Smith (ed), Federalism: the Multiethnic Challenge (Harlow:
Longman, 1995), 4.
policies it wants to devolve. In a federalist system the main components of federalism
are that both levels are constitutionally fixed, in the sense that it is not possible to
abolish either level. In a system of devolution, however, regional governments exist
but they are subordinate to the central government. This implies that these regional
governments could be established as well as abolished by the political center, the state
government.^
Therefore the main difference between confederalism, federalism and
devolution is the status of the levels of government. Under confederalism, the
‘regional’ level can abolish the confederal level, under federalism both levels are not
able to abolish each other and under a system of devolution the general government is
able to abolish the ‘regional’ level.
There are several ways in which federalist systems can appear. If the classic
federal systems of the United States, Switzerland and Germany are compared with one
another, it has to be concluded that they are all different in their make-up. For
example, in Switzerland, the Standerat and in Germany the Bundesrat are the federal
organs in which the Cantons (for Switzerland) and the Bundeslander (for Germany)
participate in the national political process. In comparison to the United States
however, they are also able to influence politics on a national basis, which it is not
possible for the state governments of the U.S. states. The U.S. states individually elect
two senators each, who, in theory, represent their state and its interest in the upper
house, the Senate. It is possible for a Senator to vote against the interests of his/her
state legislator. In Switzerland and Germany, however, the state legislators themselves
are in the position to vote according to their will.
^ Robert Malcolm Punnit, British Government and Politics (London: Heinemann, 1968), 441-3.
The modern idea of what federal government is has been exemplified by the
United States. The American federal system, as the first, constitutionally-based
arrangement of federally organized states, was borne out of practical necessity and did
not rest on any given federal theory. The American model is one of divided powers for
the federal government and for the states. This power sharing is the result of a
compromise reached between those who wanted to see a powerful nation, and those
who preferred that the states remain sovereign.^ The American constitution of 1787
however never used the words ‘federalism’ or ‘federal.’ Nonetheless it has been called
the ‘Federal Constitution.’ An important question is; What are the fundamental
characteristics of the United Sates that it is considered to be the classic example of a
federal system?
One aspect seems to be that the Constitution of the United States sets out the
guidelines of an association of states which share power on a national level. The
power is divided between the general national government for certain policy areas like
international treaties, monetary policies, etc., and the individual states, which make
policies in the areas such as education and law. This results in both the general and
regional governments operating simultaneously directly upon the people. This also
means that the people are subject to two governments. The constitution of the United
States appears at times to be somewhat vague in clearly differentiating the distributed
powers in terms of various policy-areas between state and federal government.
Nevertheless, it is very clear that once a government is acting within its allocated area,
it is not subordinate to any other government. This system would therefore be best
^ Muhammed Abdul Fazal, A federal constitutionfor the United Kingdom : an alternative to devolution
(Aldershot; Dartmouth, 1997), 24.
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described as being not sub-ordinate, but rather co-ordinate to and with each partner
member/
At the time the U.S. constitution was written, the British contributed nothing to
federal theory, although in practical terms they had already been required to find ways
of managing their growing Empire. This has led to a de facto practice of allowing their
constitutional bodies within the Commonwealth to govern on a wide range of local
issues. Although Great Britain has never been a federation, nor had any sort of
federalism, it does contain various bodies which are devolved from the political center.
Examples of this would be the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, both of which
have their own parliaments and are largely self-governed. But as these are political
arrangements, which can only be dissolved by mutual agreement, these Islands are not
classic examples of devolution, but more like federacies, as are the U.S.-Puerto Rico
or Portugal-Azores relations.^ From 1920 to 1972 Northern Ireland had its own
,. legislative and executive body that had its own legislative and executive body that
enjoyed autonomy in a wide range of domestic affairs.^ Recent examples of forms of
devolved governance include the establishment of a Scottish Parliament and the Welsh
Assembly. All of these devolved bodies have several areas of policy under their
jurisdiction in which they are able to conduct their own business vis-a-vis decision-
making. The decision as to which policies are being administrated by which devolved
bodies, and to take them back again, is however decided upon solely in the political
center, Westminster in London.
For an overview of the American constitution and American federalism see: Kenneth Clinton Wheare,
Federal Government, 4th ed. (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 1-15.
^ Ronald Lampman Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd ed. (Montreal; London: Published for the
School of Policy Studies, Queen's University by McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 8,13.
^ Frank Stacey, British Government 1966-75: years ofreform (London; Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1975), 145.
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The growing tensions in Ireland in the late eighteenth century encouraged the
British government in deciding not to move towards a federal approach. Rather it
hoped that the Union with Scotland of 1707 would be a solid foundation, and thereby
present an example for Ireland on which it too might be governed. The structure of the
way in which Ireland was administered was however already unique in the United
Kingdom. It had the status of a separate unit within the UK - this makes it different to
Wales and Scotland - with a lord lieutenant and a chief secretary as the heads of the
local government of Ireland. As self-governance was unthinkable at that time, the
management of any suggestion of potential crises would have meant central control
out of London.
For the majority of the nineteenth century, federalism was no option
whatsoever within the UK. Nevertheless, the white settlements and colonies of British
North America, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand were by mid-century either
in possession of self-governing bodies or were close to attaining them, and all were
anxious to acquire a greater degree of self-control.’
As previously mentioned the British people live in a country without one single
written constitution. Rather they have various pieces that serve as a base for a
constitution, like the ‘Bill of Rights.’ England has been a politically united country for
a thousand years, with a central legislature - however also “with a devolved
legislature,” or a local government, as Roylenot s.* * In England, as he explains, a
centralist tradition has coexisted with an administration which over a period of five
hundred years, had devolved power to parish, corporate borough and shire county.
''
For governing the British Empire see: John Kendle, Federal Britain: a history (London;New York;
Routledge, 1997), 37ff.
* Edward Royle, “Introduction; regions and identities,” in Edward Royle (ed.). Issues ofRegional
Identity (Manchester; Manchester University Press, 1998) 8-9.
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Whilst the British have never been prepared to adopt the federal idea in the
United Kingdom, they have often embraced it as a solution to problems within their
Imperial Empire. Only in the colonial sphere were they however willing to recognize
and accept federalism as a system in which to conduct policy-making. As Kendle
notes, “whenever a leading politician in the Labour or Conservative governments was
obliged to discuss the possible transfer of power to the regions, the federal idea was
always referred to as a rigid, legalistic system better suited for unsophisticated, even
‘primitive’, societies.”^
In the contemporary world, all systems of federalism are under permanent
transformation. This is true for the rather fixed federalist system like Germany or the
United States, even though their systems are set up in a constitution. However, the
constitutions often allow room for shifts of policies between the levels of government.
After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States a shift into a
stronger federal government can be observed. Smith splits his book on Federalism into
three parts. Part I “Federation in Crises?” examines the systems of Canada, Belgium,
India and Nigeria. Part II “The Break-Up of Socialist Federations” goes back into the
early 1990s and takes a closer look onto Russia, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The
last, part III “Federations in the Making?” takes a look at Spain, South Africa and
Britain.
At this stage a brief evaluation of two states, Belgium and Spain, will do to
give an impression on how federalism changes between different countries and time.
^ John Kendle, 175.
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Belgium dates back to the year of 1830. It was established as a parliamentary
democracy with a constitutional monarch. To understand the case of Belgium, one has
to take into consideration one distinctive element of the Belgium state: the ethnic/
linguistic groups within. Of the 10 million Belgians 57 per cent are Dutch-speaking,
42 per cent are French-speaking and the remaining one per cent speak German.
Belgium is split into six constituent units of three regions: Flames, Walloon and
Brussels, and three communities of the spoken languages. The constituent units
represent a territorial jurisdiction and the communities a personal jurisdiction.'® Ever
since the foundation of Belgium there has been unrest within the country. The question
of the official language has started with demands of the Flames to give Dutch equal
status to French. Combined with language, both groups argued over the economic
performance of each other and their financial contribution to the state of Belgium
itself To solve these tensions, in 1970, 1980, 1988 and 1993 Belgium tried to find
answers with constitutional devolution." Watts observes three features in today’s
Belgium distribution of powers: a high degree of decentralization, allocated powers
which appear in form of exclusive powers, and a considerable measure of asymmetry
among the constituent unit.
Whether the constitutional changes in Belgium are able to solve the problems
of the national identities within it, remains to be seen. As Murphy puts it: “If Belgium
sought to remain a unitary structure of state in the face of the pressures of the past few
decades, conflict would arguably be worse than today. At the same time, the particular
political geography of Belgium federalism has generated its own set of conflicts.
Recognition of this point highlights a critically important qualification to the common
Ronald Lampman Watts, 29.
" Ibid, 29-30.
generalization that federalism reduces conflict.”'^ Those are the reasons that in his
book Graham Smith places the ‘young’ federalist system of Belgium into the first part
of his book “Federation in Crises.”
The case in Spain has some similarities to the case of Belgium. Both have
different linguistic groups within their territitorial dimensions. Both have recently
started to reform their constitutional set-up. The reason for Spain to do so, though, is
different to Belgium, as Spain has only enjoyed democracy since the death of its
totalitarian dictator General Franco in 1975. The very centralized state under Franco
needed to establish a constitution. The constitution of 1978 opted for the territorial
integrity of Spain. As part of the democratization process the state has nevertheless
recognized the various national differences within Spain and has provided for units
called “Autonomous Communities” of which there are 17 in a country of nearly 40
million.*^ While Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia could retain full
autonomy, other regions had to fulfill a five year ‘restricted’ autonomy period. Watts
concludes: “As a unitary state engaged in devolutionary monarchy with its own
borders by a process characterized by considerable asymmetry, Spain is an interesting
example of an effort to accommodate variations in the strengths of regional pressures
for autonomy.”'^
Alexander Murphy, “Belgium’s Regional Divergence: Along the Road to Federalism,” in:
Graham
Smith, 4.
Ronald Lampman Watts, 30.
. • -
. o • u n/:
Montserrat Guibernau, “Spain: a Federation in the Making?,” in: Graham Smith,
96.
19
2.2. National Identity
For the purpose of examination of the concept of national identity in this
chapter, the terms ‘ethnic group’ and ‘nation’ are used synonymously. It should be
noted too that the term ‘nation’ is also in the literature often used interchangeably with
the term ‘state’, although they are not the same. If the nation is understood to be co-
terminus with the boundaries of a state, it is called nation-state.'^ A nation or ethnic
group may also be a ‘non-state nation’ in that members of the group may be found
within the borders of more than one state. Or, in the opposite situation, several nations
might share one state. An example of the former would be the Kurdish people who
live in the border region of Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq. An example of the latter could
be Great Britain, wherein three nations share one state, namely the state of Great
Britain which is shared by the people of Scotland, Wales and England.
The term ‘nationalism’ encompasses a broad range of meanings. One example
might be employed to connote a political meaning. This is the case when the members
of a nation-group begin to politicize their nationality. This is done in order to seek
their own state or at least a change in the status quo. Nationalist parties are an example
of a politicized national interest which sets itself apart from the rest of the party
spectrum. These nationalist parties concentrate the concerns of their nation-group
when building on their agenda.
Referring to this explanation one question arises so far. Does the term
‘nationalism’ apply only to those political parties which demand the creation of a new
and independent state? This would apparently appear to apply to the Scottish National
Ronald Lampman Watts, 31.
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Party. On the other hand, would Sinn Fein of Ireland be considered to be a
‘nationalist’ party if indeed it pursues the objective goal of achieving a common state
of Northern Ireland with Ireland? And what of those movements which utilize
ethnicity for political purposes (such as the Kurds) but who would settle for increased
political autonomy? These are all areas that touch upon the concept of nationalism.
To return to the ethnic group, an ethnic group can be seen as “any group of
people who consciously share an identifiable complex of meanings, symbols, values
and norms.”' ^ In other words, they share a common tradition based on a common
historical source of identity. Identities are the collection of all the external signs
through which people show themselves both to their own Self, and also to members of
their group and beyond.'^
This common identity often includes a shared language, but not necessarily.
The people of Switzerland share a common national identity without sharing one
language, but rather four languages. This definition also implies that a person might
belong to this group although s/he is not participating in the sharing of the norms.
Personal identity may not necessarily be an important factor in temis of one’s basic
identity. As Billig writes: “One should not presume that an identity is a hidden
psychological state, as if there is a wordless, psychological or neurological state of
Under this definition, there are few true ‘nation-states’ in the world. See: W. Conner, Nation-building
or Nation Destroying?
,
World Politics, Vol. 24 (April 1972), 319-355
’’ O. Patterson, “Context and Choice in Ethnic Allegiance: A Theoretical Framework and Caribbean
Case Study,” in: Nathan Glazcr and Daniel P. Moynihan, Er/imaV)' (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1975), 309.
'* in would start wearing ‘Icderhosen’, climb through the Alps and drink great amounts of beer in large
glasses, the members of the group Bavarians, would, at least at the beginning, assume that 1 was a
member.
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‘having an identity’. If an individual’s identity is not hidden, then it is likely that
there are symbols and codes being presented and shared. His definition also implies
that there is a form of ‘educated’ identity, which is being developed in individuals
through a socialization process beginning in childhood.
Poole provides the following definition: “[...], the term [national identity] is
often used to refer to a mode of individual existence - a way in which individuals
conceive of themselves and others. In this sense it is individuals who have identities
(or sometimes search for them), and national identity is a certain kind of shared self-
awareness”.
Building upon this definition, it seems as though (some) members of some
ethnic groups need national identity in all its forms in order to define themselves as a
means to exist. National identity is therefore required in order to access a potential
definition of one’s own sense of self. If ‘shared self-awareness’ is national identity,
then national identity is not more (and not less) than the ability to give the individual
within a collective group something to hold on to - it provides the members of an
ethnic group, each on its own, with the ‘awareness’ of being.
The following definition moves in another direction, away from the
individualistic view. Here it may be seen that an ethnic group “is one that shows a
cultural tradition and has some degree of consciousness of being different from other
such groups.”^'
If ‘difference’ is the essential ingredient of this definition, then it seems
necessary that one group must be able to distinguish itself from another one, because
Michael Billig, “From Codes to Utterances; Cultural Studies, Discourse and Psychology,”
in:
Marjorie Fergus^on and Peter Golding (eds). Cultural Studies In Question (London: Sage,
208.
Poole, R., “On National Identity: a response to Jonathan Ree,” Radical Philosophy 62
(1992), 14-15.
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without that distinction, based upon ‘identity’ - and here ‘national identity’ - the
establishment of a self-defined identity would not succeed. Only the ability to make
distinctions enables the various groups to define their identity, based upon the
differences.
To conclude, it seems apparent that national identity is defined not only by an
individual’s choice, as this identity still exists even when the individual is not
participating in the sharing of the collective symbols and manners. However, as there
are many members in various ethnic groups who do indeed want to share their
symbols and traditions, it provides the members of that group with a confidence. That
national identity, in containing the important feature of highlighting the distinctiveness
of various groups, can thereafter lead to nationalism, and therefore when necessary
and appropriate also the seeking of independence and an own state, is apparent.
Nationalism cannot exist without national identity, whereas national identity does not
necessarily evolve towards nationalism.
2.3. The territorial dimension of the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is a multinational state. It consists of four nations:
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland but is home to six national identities:
English, Scottish, Welsh, Ulster, Irish and British. However, just a minority, say in
Scotland, would identify themselves with only one identity. At the outset, one of the
problems is that the terms ‘United Kingdom’ and ‘(Great) Britain’ are often used
Pierre Louis van den Berghe, “Ethnic Pluralism in Industrial Societies; A special Case?”
in; Glazer,
242 .
interchangeably, though they are not synonymous. The correct name of the state is the
“United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.”
Despite the fact that the UK is a multi-national state, the parliament in
Westminster has always been the central point of governance in the UK. Decisions
concerning the policies in the UK are formulated and put into law there. The most
important institutions are the Parliament in Westminster, the cabinet and the civil
service in Whitehall and Downing Street No. 10, the British equivalent to the White
House in Washington D.C. It would be naive, however, to expect that a political
system could rely solely on, and work from its political ‘headquarter’, like London in
the UK, Paris in France or Washington D.C. in the USA. They could not function
without institutions set up at local levels all over the country, even though the key
decision making is done in the capitals.
Government of the UK is conducted through institutions at a variety of levels.
Local government exists throughout the UK, but the forms it takes vary from region to
region and from city to city. The UK has always had its distinct policies when it comes
to providing the regions and the local authorities with the necessary tools to perform
services for its citizens, like the National Health Service.
‘The crown in the parliament’ is the legal phrase that describes the ultimate
resting place of power. The notion of the UK as a unitary state follows from this
premise. All other institutions are subordinate to the ‘crown in parliament’ - no other
institution has the same sovereignty as the parliament. Not only are these institutions
subject to directives from Westminster, their sheer existence is determined under this
17
concept of constitution. The abolition of the local London government, the Greater
London Council in 1986 is a striking example of this extraordinary power (see later).
A different viewpoint offers the suggestion that the UK should be seen as a
union state, rather than a unitary state. The ‘unitary state’ sees the UK having been
built up around one political center, whereas in the concept of the ‘union state’, there
is acknowledgement of the importance of other institutions. The conventional view of
the UK constitutional system, here introduced by Rhodes, is a “unitary state with a
single parliament, government and civil service, deciding on policy for the whole
country and applying it through the national territory” as if there are “no national local
or other autonomous bodies which even compare in authority with national
govemment.”^^ However, as he concludes, this is false. Although Westminster may
indeed have the power to abolish institutions subordinate to it (and nowadays also the
crown), it is difficult to imagine that Westminster and other central institutions could
govern the country without some local or other autonomous bodies. Rhodes therefore
considers the UK to be a “union state.”
The diverse nature of the UK is best captured in the concept of union state. The
establishment of a Scottish Parliament, Assemblies in Northern Ireland and Wales, a
London Authority and a directly elected London Mayor as well as new regional bodies
in England would suggest that in the years ahead the view of the UK as a unitary state
will change. As the UK administration has evolved, for example through the
establishment of a parliament in Scotland, the view of the UK as a unitary state is
therefore less valid.
Roderick A. Rhodes, “Intergovernmental relations in the United Kingdom”, in; Vincent Wright and
Yves Meny (eds), Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe (London: Allan and Unwin, 1985),
33.
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As mentioned, the UK has to be seen as a multinational state. This term
implicitly acknowledges that there are also cultural dimensions to the territorial
politics of the UK. There are people with a distinct sense of, say being Welsh. This is
important in influencing how the state is organized. Unlike other countries within
Europe, like France or Spain under Franco, there has never been an attempt to reduce
these national/ local identities and to create a single UK identity. Most significantly is
to note that an exclusive sense of UK national identity does not exist. One might say:
“I am British,” but rarely would somebody say: “I am from the UK” and never: “I am
Uk-ish.”
Local, regional and national identities have persisted over time. In Northern
Ireland, for example, the identity provided by religion, in this case the protestant
religion, provides the people with the necessary focus to distinguish themselves from
the Irish and enables them therefore to transpose that identity through their given
territory. Catholics use the same formula, and their religious identity tends to identify
them with the Republic of Ireland. However, herein lies one of the reasons for the
bloody tensions, they convert this identity onto territory as well. The numbers speak a
clear language in Northern Ireland: at least 69 per cent of Catholics think of
themselves as Irish, compared with 67 per cent of Protestants thinking of themselves
as British.”^'* That is one reason why the region of Northern Ireland has been shaken
by violence and terrorism, as both groups claim their right to govern that land.
” for further discussion of union/ unitary state, see also: Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, Economy,
Territory, Identity: Politics of West European Peripheries (London: Sage, 1983), 181.
Richard Rose, Understanding the United Kingdom; The Territorial Dimension in Government
(London: Longman, 1982), 15.
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In Wales the language remains the key transmitter of national identity. Plaid
Cymru, the regional party of Wales was founded for that reason: to keep the Welsh
language (and thus the Welsh identity) from dying out. In Scotland, a somewhat
stronger sense of Scottish national identity exists. Various institutions and different
policies for areas like education and law, just to name a few, have helped to uphold
their distinct national identity, like their own educational and legal systems.
Whilst the Scots and Welsh often complain about the failure of the English
people to make the distinction between England on the one hand and Great Britain on
the other hand, the Scots and Welsh are similarly at fault in that they themselves do
not make the distinction between Great Britain and the United Kingdom.
To conclude, the United Kingdom is a country that is on the brink to become a
union state, but it still is a country with elements of a unitary state. The national
identities within the United Kingdom have fostered such a movement. Without a
strong national identity there would not have been any significant nationalist
movement to demand a change in the territorial politics of the United Kingdom.
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CHAPTER 3
NATIONAL IDENTITY
3.1. The weak national identity up until the 1 960s
For a good number of Scots a reminder of the status of their country is
provided when unknowing visitors are throwing the national differences together and
fail to make the distinctions one finds within the United Kingdom. The result is often
that everything is ‘English’ and everybody is from ‘England’.
It is understood that a nation like Scotland would compensate for this neglect
in different ways, and is therefore searching for alternative means in which to express
their identity. Sport has always been a way to address the area. On the soccer (in
British English: football) field, for example, they were undoubtedly Scottish first and
British second. Any non-Scot should be very cautious in his remarks concerning the
performance when the Scottish team plays. If, and it has not happened very often, the
Scottish national football team beat the English such a victory of this game would
relived so many times and held within the memory, that it would eventually become
its place in Scottish history.
The reasons for this national situation are not hard to find: the marginalisation
of Scotland within the United Kingdom, as a consequence of three centuries of English
hegemony. This hegemony has affected Scotland’s status worldwide, but also
domestically. Even though Scotland occupies a ‘special’ place within the UK, because
both Wales and Ireland were “incorporated through conquest,” whereas Scotland
negotiated its way into the Union of 1707, the dominance of the English neighbor is
all
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too real. The nationalistic Scot soon discovers that although the image of Scotland -
the land of tartan and whisky - is almost universally recognized, his/ her assertion of
its political and cultural distinctiveness often causes genuine puzzlement, even
amongst the English. Delving a little bit deeper into the historical context, questions
arise, such as; Should Scotland not simply be viewed as a part of England and/ or a
sub-region of England? Why is there a need for a specifically Scottish Parliament if
Scotland is receiving just representation via the parliament in Westminster? How can
Scotland want a parliament of its own when it has derived so much benefit from being
part of the United Kingdom?
It is therefore hardly surprising, that, as McCreadie puts it, “it caused
generations of Scottish people to believe that their culture was, and indeed always has
been, a provincial and somewhat inferior version of the English culture.” The result is
“that it was apparently prepared to swallow its pride, even if it hurt, and accept its
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diminishing status as an appendage of England.”
The lack a of sufficient independence movement in Scotland can be linked to
the relative economic prosperity. This prosperity has always been linked to the
existence of a common market with England. Since the Union, Scottish businesses
have been able to sell and conduct their business in the huge market England provides.
As the British Empire started to grow, the opportunities for advancement provided by
the British State, simultaneously giving Scotland access to a truly global empire and
global market, would not have encouraged the desire to seek any kind of independence
Andrew Gamble, “Territorial Politics,” in Patrick Dunleavy et al., (eds). Developments in
British
Po////C5 4, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 75.
Robert McCreadie, “Scottish Identity and the Constitution”, in Bernard Crick
(ed). National
Identities. The Constitution ofthe United Kingdom (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991),
41-42.
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or change in the United Kingdom. That the Scots have not only profited from the
existence of the Empire, but also helped increasing its powers, as stressed by
Davidson: it was the Scottish participation in the Empire that helped bring the
British nation into being. (...) It was this consciousness which developed in Scotland
and England in step with the expansion of the Atlantic Empire (...), and which is best
encapsulated in the song ‘Rule, Britannia,’ written by James Thomson in 1740.”^*
Scotland was, in these terms, a beneficiary of the Union and the Empire. Sheer
pragmatism discouraged any thoughts that might have initiated change in the status of
the Union. In other words, as long as the Union and the Empire brought benefits, of
whatever kind, into Scotland, Scotland found itself satisfied with its position. As
Webb views it, “the bargain seemed a good one. The sublimation of the Scottish
identity in favor ofjoint determination was the cost that Scotland paid for the benefits
that flowed from the Union.”^^
Nationalism was not prominent in Scottish life between the middle of the
eighteenth-century and the late nineteenth-century. The reason usually given is that the
nations interest was directed elsewhere. Scotland was developing economically and
industrially at a tremendous pace. Another reason for a strong Union at that time is the
increase in mobility. With trains connecting all parts of the country, Edinburgh
suddenly seemed rather close to London, hence the country was moving together, at
least in terms of time spent traveling.
” Even though there are huge demographic and economic differences between Scotland and England.
* Neil Davidson, The Origins ofScottish Nationhood, (London; Sterling,Va.: Pluto Press, 2000), 1 13-
1 14.
Keith Webb, The Growth ofNationalism in Scotland, (Harmondsworth; Penguin Books, 1978), 86.
With the turn of the centuries not very much changed. The beginning of the
twentieth century proved to be a rather bad time for any nationalists. Perhaps most
important of all, the traumas of the First World War of 1914-1918, followed by the
worldwide economic crises in the 1 920s and then even more the Second World War of
1939-1945 brought the whole British nation closer together. Webb observes,
“Nationalism as a ‘pure’ political interest only really becomes evident after the First
World War.”^° And Morgan adds, “the climax of British unionism was reached during
the Second World War.”^* The people in Scotland and in the rest of the United
Kingdom believed that the wars could only have been won by the combined efforts
and suffering of a united nation.
Nevertheless, at the end of the war the Scottish National Party, introduced in
the following chapter, gained their first electoral victory and sent one MP (from the
seat of Motherwell) to Westminster. The reasons for this result are due less to an
increase of an independence movement, but rather more a result of the circumstances
the war provided (see the Scottish National Party - History).
Mitchell acknowledges the general view of the ‘climax of Britishness’ during
the war; however, he provides an interesting poll on self-government for Scotland:
Keith Morgan, “Regional and National Identities in the United Kingdom”, in Trevor
Salmon and
Michael Keating (eds). The Dynamics ofDecentralization: Canadianfederalism and
British devolution
(Montreal; London: Published for the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University by
McG.ll-Queen’s
University Press, 2001), 13.
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Table 1; Gallup Poll on self-government for Scotland
76% for [self-government in Scotland]
1 3% against [self-government in Scotland]
11% no views [on self-government in Scotland]
Divided by party [supporters]:
80% of Socialists [are pro self-government]
75% of Tories [are pro self-government]
70% of Liberals [are pro self-government]
To put this poll into context, Mitchell offers two interpretations: “first, the
evidence suggests that there was a strong sense of Scottish national identity but not of
Scottish nationalism. The second interpretation is that there is indeed ample evidence
of support for a parliament, but that it was not felt strongly, other than by a small
minority of campaigners.” And Morgan adds: “The SNP put up a mere three
candidates in the 1950 election, all hopeless cases. [...] The Nationalist challenge
could at this stage easily be brushed aside.”
Another reason for the weakness of a nationalistic movement throughout this
time period lies in the inherently leftist political attitude of the Scottish people.
Historically the Labour party was always stronger than any other party in Scotland.
The political dominance of a labor movement has placed class above national identity.
It firmly suppressed the enthusiasm for Home Rule amongst the Scots and the Scottish
members of the Labour party. From the Labour party’s point of view the ‘class-
as published in the Daily Express (2 July 1947); James Mitchell, “From National
Identity to
Nationalism 1945-99;” in Harry T. Dickinson and Michael Lynch (eds), The Challenge
to Westminster;
Sovereignty, Devolution and Independence, East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2000), 155.
Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945-1951
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(Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 294.
struggle’ was more important than any independence movement.^"* Only when the
working classes of the UK could be united, could universal prosperity for everybody
be achieved. This, obviously, did not help to establish a recognizable demand of the
Scottish people towards more independence. Neither the main political parties. Labour
and Conservatives, nor the other major political players had Home Rule on their
agenda. All believed that a strong union would better serve the country. The
nationalists in Scotland had at this point no voice in London.
Even though this is speculative, it is unlikely that any of these factors would -
at any time after the foundation of the Union of 1707 - have prevented the creation of
a parliament in Edinburgh had the Scottish public been enthusiastic about it. The fact
is that they had no particular desire for democratic self-governance as long as the
Union offered the best prospect of continuing economic advantage.
Besides the question of war, economic prosperity and what the two big parties
general view concerning the constitution had been, “if Scots at this time did want a
parliament, then it was not very high on their agenda. Politics is not only about
preferences but also about priorities and a Scottish parliament was not a high priority,”
as Mitchell sees it.^^ Even though the need might have never been apparent over the
centuries, other states with several national identities would have provided their
political system with some kind of federalist principles. But the Scots “prided
themselves on their internationalism, remained so parochial in their thinking that until
recently they refused to look beyond their own shores.”^^
Ian Donnachie, Christopher Harvie and Ian S. Wood (eds), Forward - Labour Politics in Scotland
(Edinburgh: Polygon, 1989), 35-38 and 72-75.
” Mitchell, J., “From National Identity to Nationalism 1945-99,” in Harry T.
Dickinson, 155.
Robert McCreadie, “Scottish Identity and the Constitution,” in Bernard Crick, 42.
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As mentioned, the Scottish National Party has already entered the political
stage, as it was able to gain their first seat in Westminster at a by-election at the end of
the war. Hence it would now be appropriate to take a closer look at this party, even
though the SNP will not start being an influential factor in British and Scottish politics
until the 1970s.
3.1.1. The Scottish National Party
The Scottish National Party (SNP) sees itself as a left of center party, working
only in and for Scotland, but running for seats in the national, Westminster, as well as
regional elections. The goal of the SNP is an independent Scotland as evidenced in
their manifesto.
The means of achieving this goal have changed several times in the last
decades. The SNP had problems finding its position towards today’s parliament in
Edinburgh. Is, on the one hand, a devolved parliament a helpful step for them, in order
to convince the Scottish people to incrementally move in the direction of more self-
reliance? Or, on the other hand, is the current elected body working against the SNP,
in that the electorate views the work of the parliament as being successful and they
therefore do not see the necessity for yet more political freedom.
3.1.2. The History of the SNP
The SNP originates in 1934, when it was founded after a merger of the
TJational Party of Scotland’, which wanted a hundred per cent independence for
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Scotland and the ‘Scottish Party’, which was more moderate and wished a change of
the status quo towards a more sovereign Scotland.
From early on the SNP was able to attract more voters in northern Scotland
{Highlands) and the Hebrides {Western Islands) than in the Lowlands and its larger
population. This remains the case today.
The SNP won its first parliamentary seat in the final days of the Second World
War. Dr Robert McIntyre was elected for Motherwell on 12 April 1945 in a by-
election. The rather unusual circumstances of the war, with a coalition in operation and
each party agreeing only to contest by-elections previously held, help to explain that
result . Nevertheless it was a huge success for the SNP, even though they lost that
seat in the next general election.
After the Second World War the SNP had trouble in appealing to the voters in
Scotland. By the mid 1960s the SNP had experience in exploiting economic
dissatisfaction in the country. In a by-election in 1962 they stressed the “economic and
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social murder” of the dying coal industries in Scotland.”
The real growth of the SNP started a few years later. The national movement
had to wait until the late 1960s. By then geologists had discovered oil in the North
Sea. These oil fields would legally be in Scottish hands, as they lie within Scotland’s
territorial waters, but the main companies involved in extracting the oil were British,
or in this case, rather, English companies, based in London. The tax revenues from the
oil, not going directly to Scotland, were directed into the national budget of the U.K.
James Mitchell, ‘From National Identity to Nationalism
1945-99’; in Harry T. Dickinson 162^
Henry M. Drucker and Gordon Brown, The politics ofNationalism and
Devolution (London; New
York; Longman, 1980), 45.
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with Scotland not receiving any direct financial contributions from the oil revenues.^’
The slogan then adopted by the SNP to address the issue “It’s Scotland’s Oil’’ fulfilled
its purpose; the SNP was able to appeal to the voters and mobilize them.'’® The SNP
chose a good moment, in September 1972, to launch that campaign; a year later the
prices per barrel had risen by a factor of six to eight compared with the levels of 1972;
the North Sea Oil therefore started to play an influential factor in politics.'” In October
1974 the SNP gathered 30.4 per cent of the overall votes in Scotland, thus making the
SNP the second largest party to Labour, overtaking the Conservatives in terms of its
percentage of the total vote in Scotland. In the 1980s the SNP and its influence on the
Scottish people fell and it struggled to remain the alternative to Labour and
Conservatives. Only in the late 1980s it “recovered from its post- 1979 [defeat in the
referendum] hangover.”'*^ In the 1990s the SNP were able to come close to their
electoral support from the 1970s and it resulted in a stronger SNP vote than the
Conservatives. The SNP became, and is until today, the second strongest party in
Scotland after the Labour Party. The SNP’s rise over the last decades has threatened
not only the hegemony of Labour in Scotland, but also Labour’s chances of continuing
to be a strong party all over the United Kingdom. The electoral success of the SNP
posed a challenge to all the parties that sought to preserve the United Kingdom as it
was.
for an overview on the impact of oil on the fiscal politics in the UK see. David Heald, Financing
devolution within the United Kingdom: a study ofthe lessonsfrom failure. Research Monograph No.
32, Center for Research on Federal Financial Relations (Canberra; Australian National
University,
1980), 73-78.
for an examination on the relationship between SNP & oil see: Roger Levy, Scottish nationalism at
the crossroads (Edinburgh ; Scottish Academic Press, 1990), 35-38.
Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism; Scottish Society and Politics 1 707-1994, 2nd ed.
(London: Routledge, 1994), 184.
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Table 2: SNP results in the general elections of 1955-2001
Election Candidates Seats
1935 n/a —
1945 n/a
1950 n/a
1951 n/a
1955 2
1959 5
1964 15
1966 23 —
1970 65 1
1974 (Feb) 70 7
1974 (Oct) 71 11
1979 71 2
1983 72 2
1987 71 3
1992 72 3
1997 72 6
2001 72 5
Total votes % of Scottish total
n/a 1.1
n/a 1.2
n/a 0.4
n/a 0.3
12.112 0.5
21.738 0.8
64.044 2.4
128.474 5.0
306.802 11.4
633.180 21.9
839.617 30.4
504,259 17.3
331,975 11.8
416,873 14.0
629,552 21.5
617,260 21.9
464,314 20.1
3.1.3. Electorate of the SNP
As previously touched upon, the SNP voters are mainly to be found in the rural
areas of Scotland, particular in the Highlands. The reasons for less support for the SNP
in the Lowlands, which includes Glasgow and Edinburgh, are diverse. First of all, the
living standard, the salaries and wages, and the overall infrastructure in any respect are
better developed in the central belt than in the north. Another reason is that a
substantial number of English people live in the southern parts of Scotland. These
voters tend not to vote SNP. The overall interconnection of southern Scotland (known
as the Borders Region) with (northern) England is greater than in any other part of
Scotland. There is ‘conflict of interest’ of Scots, who might allow their economic
interest to overshadow their nationalism. The fear behind this thought is that a strong
'to
SNP with their independence-agenda might cause a withdrawing of English business
and money.
It is a rather interesting phenomenon that the SNP faces problems in attracting
voters on the Shetland- and Orkney-Islands, despite the fact that these are the areas in
which the oil is drilled, when it is claimed by the SNP that this is ‘Scottish oil.’ The
reasons for this are similar to those mentioned above; the economic gains of the rather
well paid oil workers leads them to the conclusion that a strong SNP would hurt their
personal situation.
The electorate of the SNP is represented at all social levels, although the main
voters are amongst the middle-classes. In the last years the SNP has also been able to
attract a high percentage of younger voters.
It is possible to make a distinction between three groups, who are all served in
their political beliefs by the SNP. The first group is the Scots, who wish total
%
independence from the U.K. and who wish to see they living in an independent
Scotland. The second group sees the future in a partly devolved Scotland from the
U.K., holding the right to elect their own legislative and executive. Nevertheless, they
wish maintain ties between Edinburgh and London, and therefore foster a form of
federalist state. Role models could be the U.S.A. or Germany. The third group who
votes for the SNP believes that Scotland should have a more influential role within the
U.K. They believe that a strong SNP is the appropriate way to promote Scotland’s
interest in London. However, they do not wish an independent Scotland, as they see
the various benefits a united country offers them.
The attraction to the voters and the electoral success of the SNP is sometimes
explained as ‘protest votes’ against the party they usually tend to vote for. A protest
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vote is generally based on poor performance, usually economically, of the
government. In the case of the SNP, as a nationalist party, protest votes could be based
on a connection between events in Scotland and events in England. It might be true to
say that to a certain extent, the SNP receives votes from dissatisfied voters. This
explanation does make sense as the SNP itself had never (except in some local
councils) had any political responsibility and was always a party of the opposition and
the SNP was therefore never able to demonstrate its ability to perform in office. A
dissatisfied voter might therefore believe that the SNP is fundamentally different than
any other party, and that the SNP would be able to conduct policies more
satisfactorily.'*^
However, it speaks against the notion of seeing the party as a classic protest
party. Protest parties are known to get some electoral recognition over a limited
amount of time, after that they usually disappear again. The SNP, however, became a
major political player in Scottish politics in meanwhile some forty years, the
explanation of its successes purely based on protest votes seems therefore less
persuasive. Nevertheless, in the current political situation of a Prime Minister strongly
favoring a war against Iraq, the SNP might be able to receive votes based on a protest
of the electorate towards the government in London (see later- Conclusions).
Finally, there is one essential problem the SNP has to cope with. This is -
ironically enough - the founding of the Scottish Parliament. Although the SNP is able
to claim a major victory, as this is a (first) important step in its desire to transfer
political power from Westminster, it is questionable if the SNP in the future is still
able to attract these two groups within the electorate, who do not wish independence.
For an examination of SNP & protest votes see; Keith Webb, 75-81.
There is the notion that the process of Devolution should stop at this point. As that has
already been achieved, the future will determine whether the SNP is able to convince
the Scottish people that the ‘piece’ of the cake they received is not enough.
3.1.4. Policies of the SNP
In a 1992 written manifesto, entitled “Independence in Europe - Make it
happen now” the SNP lists 17 points, in which the need for autonomy of Scotland is
being stressed.'*'* The most important ones of the 1 7 points should be mentioned;
“Six steps to independence” and “A constitution for Scotland” are aiming for a
Scotland as an autonomous country within Europe, giving itself constitutional
guarantee of civil rights, according to the European Convention on Human Rights. The
section “Action for Jobs” demonstrates the general leftist political base of the SNP.
The manifesto declares that the immense amounts of oil revenue, since the 1980s over
£100 billion, should go into a form of job creation scheme. This would have the
impact of eventually reducing the number of unemployed people, which in Scotland
has been consistently higher than the British average.
In “Housing for People” the SNP calls for more subsidized housing, lower the
number of homeless people, generally and provide a decent housing.
Another important point of the SNP manifesto focuses on the rural areas of
Scotland, in which they call for a lasting restructuring and transfer of estate: “Farming
[...] is the backbone of the rural economy [...] (and)
land is the basic resource of
Scotland and should not be misused by millionaire owners.
Independence in Europe: make it happen now!; The 1992 manifesto of the
Scottish National Party
(Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 1992)
In the sections “Defence” and “Living in a safe Scotland” the fundamental
disagreement with the British nuclear policies, whether they are civil or military, arc
articulated. At this point it should be mentioned that huge parts of the Scottish coast is
virtually uninhabited and because of its exposed geographical location combined with
a lot of natural harbors it is a base for several British as well as U.S. nuclear
submarines. For decades there have been camps of anti-nuclear protestors close to
these bases.
The SNP has mined the potentials of Europe for its purposes. In a slogan
“Independence in Europe” - the SNP asserted that the home of Scotland should be
both inside and outside the Union; outside of the UK-Union and inside the European
Union. It was in the 1980s that the SNP started moving away from its long-standing
opposition towards the European Community This is a significant change of SNP’s
long-standing opposition towards Europe. This commitment towards Europe was also
seen to make independence more realistic and was also an attractive option for the
electorate.'’^ This change in position would mean that Scotland, as an independent
country, would have its place as an equal partner within the European Union. This
implies that Scotland would have parity with England at the negotiation tables in
Brussels.
From this selection of parts of the SNP-agenda, one is able to see that the SNP
is often more left leaning than the (New-) Labour Party.
To achieve their political goals, the SNP believes it requires to hold half of the
seats of the Scottish Parliament or half of the seats of the Scottish MP’s sitting
in
Westminster. Achieving that, the SNP believes it has a mandate to start moving
Alice Brown and Richard Parry (eds), Scottish Government Yearbook
1990 (Edinburgh: Paul Hams
Publ 1977-1992), 35.; James Mitchell, ‘Factions, Tendencies and Conscensus
in the SNP
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towards independence from the United Kingdom. As referenda are considered to be
the only legitimate way to any changes towards independence, the SNP has promised
to hold a referendum in order to gain independence from Britain.'*’
It is pertinent to examine the Scottish National Party in a chapter of its own.
When it comes to national identity in Scotland, the SNP would always be mentioned,
as they themselves try to connect their party with taking the lead in promoting a sense
of Scottish identity. Whether they are indeed truly the ‘champion’ of the Scottish
people, at least when fighting for their political determination in London, is undecided.
3.2. Consensus Politics
The SNP disappeared from parliament again after the general election in 1945,
only three months after the Motherwell by-election in which Robert MacIntyre won
the first seat for the SNP.
After the Second World War, “the decade after the Conservatives came to
power in 1951 was a very British period in Scottish politics,” as Mitchell describes
that time.'** This is also reflected in the electoral outcome; in 1955 the Conservatives
were able to gather 50 per cent of the Scottish vote and more than 50 per cent of the
seats; 36 to Labour’s 34 seats.**^
The time period after the Second World War was known as classic ‘consensus
politics.’ The term ‘consensus’ refers to the broad agreement between the two major
Peter Lynch, SNP, 248-250
Ibid, 248-250.
James Mitchell, “From National Identity to Nationalism 1945-99”; in Harry T. Dickinson, 162.
Andrew Gamble, “Territorial Politics”, in Patrick Dunleavy, 76.
parties on the substance of public policy in the key areas of the economy, social
policies, welfare and defense.
The substance of the consensus in terms of policy was the general agreement
by both parties in government to give high priority to the maintenance of full
employment, a high level of public spending on a wide range of benefits and services,
and the broad balance between the public and private sectors attained in the ‘mixed’
economy of this time period. ‘Consensus’ politics are also seen as a political state in
which the two parties had no great ideological differences. Characteristic of this
attitude was the acceptance of the Conservative Government of 1951-64 of the
previously Labour Governments’ initiatives on public ownership, welfare and
economic management. The major components of ‘consensus’ were:^® full
employment, through wage control and encouragement through state and private
spending via tax cuts, and/ or reduced interest rates; the mixed economy, with
industries like coal, gas, electricity, railways, air transport which were taken into
public ownership; a Welfare State with a broad range of benefits, a National Health
Service - free to everybody - and a compulsory secondary education to the age of 15;
a Keynesian approach to economic management in which the government assumes
responsibility for running the economy; moderate political parties, with the
Conservatives led from the interventionist compassionate center-left (a position later
designated as ‘wet’ by Thatcher), and Labour led from the center-right.^' The politics
of consensus also extended to the issue of the union. Both parties have supported the
based on: Dennis Kavanagh, Thatcherism and British Politics; The End ofConsensus? (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1987), 40-57.
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union, and therefore avoided devolution to Scotland and Wales, and worked to keep
Northern Ireland within the union.*^
Consensus politics in all policy areas dominated the political culture well
throughout the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Only the increasing pressure to reconsider the
consensus on the Union-state, best articulated in the rising support for separatism
through the victories of the SNP starting in the late 1960s, fostered a change of view
concerning this issue amongst parts of the Labour party. However, it would appear
that many Labour politicians could not see how devolution could operate “while the
party was committed to equal social rights across the state,” hence the party remained
divided on that issue.^^
Overall the time of consensus - at least until the late 1960s and early 1970s -
within British politics did nothing to foster an increase of concern towards national
identity in Scotland. Overall both parties agreed on the issues of daily politics and
determination of the country. Only when the economy started to decline and in
connection with this decline the SNP grew stronger, to be discussed in the next
chapter, the part of ‘consensus’ that dealt with the political and constitutional set-up of
the country changed. Parts of the Labour party began to rethink the position of
Scotland within the Union in order to find an appropriate solution to the growth of
support for the Scottish National Party.
“Ibid, 11.
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3.3. The rise of national identity
Although the Scots’ awareness of their national identity was weakened by
domination of the ‘Britishness’ throughout the whole island and over several
generations, it was not destroyed. Most Scottish people remained very conscious of
their ‘own’ separate history.
Up until the late 1960s there is not much evidence to support a change in the
Scottish attitude towards the need for constitutional change. In the late 1960s,
however, a whole generation started to rebel and question the political systems of
Western Europe. Demonstrations and riots shook up the current systems and a new
generation of young people claimed a need for a different structure of society.
Suddenly it became visible how vulnerable the societies are to these kinds of ‘threats’
to the social order, but also what huge potential powers lie in the civil society when
demanding changes.
Simultaneously the economic prosperity in Britain began to slow down.
Problems started in the 1960s, yet for the economy the 1970s proved to be an even
greater challenge to maintain the levels of prosperity and growth seen a decade before.
The oil crisis as a result of the Yom Kippur War led to galloping oil prices on the
world market and all western societies were caught on the vulnerability towards the
energy factor oil. A new word was found for the crises: stagflation (stagnation +
inflation), meaning rising inflation combined with rising unemployment and a decline
of the growth rates. At this time the British economy was hit especially hard and
strikes started paralyzing the economy. There was a clear sense, as Mitchell
analyses
James Mitchell, “Towards a new Constitutional Settlement”, in Colin Hay (ed),
British Politics Today
(Cambridge: Polity, 2002), 246.
it, “that the government started loosing control,” and therefore “the context of Scottish
politics had been changing and was becoming more conducive to the national
movement’s aims.”^'*
At this time the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development) released figures demonstrating that Britain was amongst the poorest
performers of all large western countries. Between 1962 and 1972, for example,
OECD calculated that annual percentages rates of economic growth (GDP) were faster
in West Germany and Italy, twice as fast in France and over four times as fast in
Japan.^^ Although in the 1970s Britain was more prosperous than ever before, the
country was slipping steadily down the international economic league table. The
British economy was in decline.
Table 3: Rates of GDP, GDP per capita, 1913-2000
Growth rates of real GDP (annual percentage growth rates)
1913-50 1950-73 1973-79 1979-92 1993-2000
France 1.1 5.0 2.8 2.0 1.7
Germany 1.1 6.0 2.3 2.3 1.4
UK 1.3 3.0 1.5 1.7 3.0
USA 2.8 3.9 2.8
Growth rates ofGDP per capita (annual percentage growth rates)
2.2 3.7
1913-50 1950-73 1973-79 1979-92 1990-99
France 1.1 4.0 2.3 1.5
0.9
Germany 0.3 5.0 2.5 1.8
1.2
UK 0.8 2.5 1.5 1.4 1.3
USA 1.6 2.4 1.8 1.2 1.8
James Mitchell, “From National Identity to Nationalism
1945-99”; in Harry T. Dickinson, 156
Andrew Gamble “The politics of economic decline”, in Martin Burch and
Michael Moran (eds),
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The living standard in many European countries as well as those in the United
States, Canada and Australia was higher than in the UK. That West Germany, defeated
in World War II, outperformed Britain, was particularly pertinent. For Scotland, it has
enjoyed a growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rather less compares with the
rest of the United Kingdom.^^ The inflation rate rose, from 9 per cent between 1970-74
(under Conservatives) to an annual average of 15 per cent between 1974-79 (under
Labour).
In order to address these difficulties, the government increased the ratio of
public spending to the GDP to reduce unemployment, but nonetheless, the
relationships between levels of unemployment and inflation was rocketing.^^
Clive H. Lee, Scotland and the United Kingdom. The economy and the
union in the t^^•entieth century’
(Manchester; Manchester University Press, 1995), 52.
’’ Dennis Kavanagh, 125.
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Table 4: Unemployment and inflation UK, 1956-2001"® Unemployment in Scotland
and the UK, 1963-2000."^
Year Ue Infl.t Year Ue 1lnn.f%t Year I I<» ro/ \ I_n /o/
\
1956 1.0 2.0 1972 4.0 7.1 1988 8.5 5 9
1957 1.3 3.7 1973 3.0 9.2 1989 7.1 8.5
1958 1.9 3.0 1974 2.9 16.1 1990 6.9 9.8
1959 2.0 0.6 1975 4.3 24.2 1991 7.7 6.9
1960 1.5 1.0 1976 5.6 16.5 1992 n/a 4.3
1961 1.3 3.4 1977 6.0 15.8 1993 10.5 3.4
1962 1.8 2.6 1978 5.9 8.2 1994 7.0 3.2
1963 2.2 2.1 1979 5.0 13.4 1995 n/a 2.5
1964 1.6 3.3 1980 6.4 15.0 1996 n/a 3.1
1965 1.3 4.8 1981 9.8 12.0 1997 7.0 2.9
1966 1.4 3.9 1982 11.3 8.6 1998 6.3 3.2
1967 2.2 2.5 1983 12.4 5.3 1999 5.6 2.9
1968 2.3 4.7 1984 11.7 4.6 2000 5.3 3.0
1969 2.3 5.4 1985 11.2 5.5 2001 5.1 n/a
1970 2.5 6.4 1986 11.2 3.9
1971 3.3 9.4 1987 10.3 4.2
1963-73 1973-79 1979-88 1988-93 1999-2000
Scotland 4.7 6.4 11.6 9.5 7.1
UK 2.8 4.8 9.1 8.1 5.7
What needs to be added is that even though the rate of unemployment in
Scotland is higher than the total UK rate, regional disparity within the United
Kingdom is great. Between 1988-93 the percentage rate has been higher in Northern
Ireland (13.9), North (10.6), the same in North West (9.5) and just slightly smaller in
Wales (8.9) and Yorkshire/ Humberside (8.7). The lowest rate could be found in East
Anglia (5.6), South East (6.6) and South West (6.7)."'*
(for the years 1956-91) adapted from: David McKay, “Economic difficulties and government
response 1931-1993”, in Ian Budge and David McKay (eds). The Developing British Political System:
The 1990s, 3rd ed. (London: Longman, 1993), 15.
(for the years 1992-2001) OECD Economic Surveys 1992-2000, United Kingdom, OECD 1993-2001
(for the years 1963-1993) Clive H. Lee, 67.
(for the years 1999-2000) Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 2002, No. 665 (London: The Stationary
Office, 2002), 41
Clive H. Lee, 67.
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It would seem that to many Scots, the Union suddenly was no longer the
guarantee of a well-ordered economy, but was rather the basis for greater economic
problems in connection with rising unemployment.
At the same time, when in 1971 North Sea oil was discovered, nationalists
argued that the oil would make everyone in a free Scotland rich. It did not take long
and a sense of oil fever emerged. For one thing, the Shetland islanders might make a
more relevant claim to the wealth, and they might be as ready to separate from
Scotland as Scotland is from England.^^ G. McCrone, here writing in 1979, expressed
the view that the existing constitutional arrangements [in the context of the oil-
revenue] were favorable to Scotland; “some nationalists argue that Scotland subsidizes
England. Some of those who wish to believe this will no doubt continue to do so but
the evidence gives no more support to their case than to those who believe the earth is
flat.”^^
A reason why the oil-argument is raised today to a far lesser extent as it was
done so in the 1 970s is that the impression could arise that somehow Scotland would
need to rely on it. If that was the case, it would be seen as a weakness of Scotland’s
economy, hence solely the oil-factor does not prove to be a solid argument for
independence.
The SNP had been working since its foundation to prepare a strong
independent movement. The timing of the discovery of the oil in the North Sea was
particularly welcome. The weakening of the British economy has stimulated this rival
of national feeling. The decline in economic terms, the discovery of oil in the
North
Victor Kiernan, ‘The British isles; Celts and Saxon’, in Mikul^s Teich and
Roy Porter (eds), The
National Question in Europe in Historical Context, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996),
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(Oxford; Blackwell, 1969), 106.
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Sea, on the shores of Scotland, rising unemployment and the overall ‘questioning’ of
the social systems and given structures of western nations helped the Scots to rethink
their position within the country. Following that, more and more Scots spoke out on
the need to build a state on their own. So, between 1966 and 1974, the SNP’s vote
increased from 5 per cent to 30 per cent and it captured 1 1 of the 72 parliamentary
seats in the UK Parliament.
Throughout the centuries England’s dominance over her neighbors rested
essentially on her greater wealth and resources, and indeed for much of the past on the
more advanced stage of civilization. But now all has suddenly changed. Though the
nations, like Scotland, cannot claim to enjoy great prosperity themselves, it has
become obvious that they cannot look forward to being “swept onwards and upwards
on the coat-tails of England.”
3.4. The referendum of 1979
The rise of the SNP and its electoral victories did not remain unnoticed.
Furthermore, for Labour the growth of the SNP was being seen as a real threat. In
order to address the problem. Labour began to build plans in the late 1970s for the
establishment of a Scottish and Welsh Assembly. Initially, these plans were conducted
half-heartedly, as there were large numbers amongst the Labour MP’s who thought
that a move away under the current constitutional system would be a great
mistake.
These were not only Labour backbenchers from England, but also
parts of the Labour
party in Scotland believed that this would be wrong and damage the
Union. To make
" Nevil Johnson, In Search Of The Constitution: Reflections on State and
Society in Britain, (London:
Methuen, 1980), 111.
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things even worse, the ‘yes’ campaign was not getting the whole-hearted support from
the government itself. Other issues were more important to the government, like
getting a hold on the bad-running economy. The referendum for Devolution was held
on 1 March 1979.
The Labour government was devastated by the outcome of the referendums. In
Scotland the ‘yes’ camp failed to meet the restrictions imposed by the legislation that
no less than 40 per cent of the total electorate (not just the votes) should vote in favor.
That restriction had been established by Parliament against the wishes of the Labour
government but was supported by a substantial number of Labour backbenchers. That
a positive outcome was therefore quite impossible to achieve is obvious. Labour MP’s,
who preferred to see a ‘no’ in the results, implemented the 40 per cent rule. The
results, 51.6 per cent ‘yes’ with a turnout of 63.6 per cent, brought a majority for a
devolved body, but it was not enough. The SNP, obviously unhappy with the result,
demanded that the referendum would be accepted and that the 40 per cent rule would
be ignored. If that would not happen, the leadership of the SNP threatened to support a
notion of no confidence at Westminster.
As a result of the outcome of the failed referendum, the government was faced
with a vote of no confidence in parliament within days. Lacking a majority. Labour
needed the support of at least one of the opposition parties to stay in power.
But after
the defeat in the referendums. Labour had great difficulty in maintaining
this majority
and was finally defeated by one vote on 28 March
1979.'* It lost the vote 31 1 to 310.
This happened mainly because the SNP implemented its threat to bring
the government
would not announce its intention to use a three-line whip to
defeat the repeal order to the
(see: David Heald, 2)
down if it
Scotland Act.
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All 1 1 SNP MPs voted with the Conservatives.^^ Lynch quotes the defeated Labour
Prime Minister Jim Callaghan on the behavior of the SNP “as turkeys [the SNP]
voting for an early Christmas.” The results of the upcoming elections in May 1979
were the beginning of 18 long years in opposition.
The 1979 referendums are a difficult memory for the Labour party. The battle
over devolution was lost in 1979, mainly because of the deep dislike between Labour
and Conservatives on that issue and the deep split in Labour’s own ranks.
Beginning in the late 1960s, the first real changes in attitude towards the Union
can be found in Scotland. As the sense of a Scottish national identity started to grow,
so too did the number of seats the SNP gained in Westminster. The Labour party’s
hesitant approach in supporting the devolution referendum in 1979 destined it to
failure.
3.5. Conservative Years
3.5.1. Thatcher
The following chapter examines an unpleasant political experience for the
Scottish people after a new Prime Minister from the Conservatives came to power
ini 979. The economy in the UK was still struggling, inflation was sky-high, and the
Labour party seemed to be unable to address the crisis in any pertinent way.
The
Conservatives offered an alternative: Margaret Thatcher.
Peter Lynch, 1 53
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Scotland has traditionally been a country of a left-leaning Liberalism, but in the
first half of the twentieth century the Conservatives established their power-bases,
predominantly amongst Protestants and within rural areas. From the 1920s until the
1960s support for the Conservatives was almost equal to that of Labour.^®
All of this changed in 1979 with the election of a Conservative government
under the leadership of Thatcher. Immediately she dismissed any suggestion of
political or administrative authority being devolved to Scotland. There were also many
Conservatives who supported Thatcher believing that the Scots were not serious about
devolution, based on the results of the referendum in 1979. The failure of the
devolution referendum helped the Thatcher government to reach the assumption that
the constitutional stability of the Union was intact. Ever after Thatcher showed
hostility towards any kind of changes in the direction of Devolution.
The following are the main implications of Thatcher’s strategy for the
Conservative territorial code: a) a package of public expenditure cuts affecting
regional program’s, b) a 1979 Northern Ireland initiative attempting to find some
agreement in the Province for a move away from direct rule to a form of regional-wide
devolved government; c) the repeal of the Scotland and Wales Act following the
referendum results in 1979.’' For the government there are three, not two, main
players in the territorial arena - central government, local governments and individual
citizens. Bulpitt tries to set the record of Thatcher straight; “The attack [of Thatcher’s
government] is not on local autonomy per se, but on the whole range of territorial
agencies (including local authorities) which have grown so powerful since the
early
™ Andrew Gamble, ‘Territorial Politics’, in Peter Dunleavy, 76
, ,
. • u
” based on: James Bulpitt, “Conservatism, Unionism and Territorial
Management”, in Peter Madgwick
and Richard Rose (eds). The Territorial Dimension in United
Kingdom Politics, (London ; Longman;
1982) 166-167.
1960s and which, in the Government’s view, obstruct the autonomy of local
citizens.”’^
Bulpitt might have a valid point here. However, in practical terms there is no
doubt that Thatcher has had great problems with some local authorities who might
have stood in the way of implementing her policies. Of course, many of these local
authorities were run by Labour councilors, who themselves created just one of the
obstacles which stood between her ambitions and the citizens. The abolition of the
local authority of London, the Greater London Council, was just one example of her
attitude. The reason for the abolition was mainly based on the view that it was far too
left wing for Thatcher.
The term ‘Thatcherism’ emerged in the 1980s to describe the policies
conducted by Prime Minister Thatcher after her election in 1979, and also the political
culture of her reign. ‘Thatcherism’ stands for various policies, but two of her main
objectives are concerned with individualism and privatization. On the issue of
individualism, Thatcher saw the role of the state as being a force to be utilized in order
to strengthen the individual and his/ her ability to manage their lives with the
minimum reliance on the state; Thatcher therefore started cutting welfare benefits. She
believed that the state’s role is not to run main parts of the economy; that is why
Thatcher conducted a huge privatization policy of the nationalized state companies.
‘Thatcherism’ did not find great support and approval amongst the Scots, as in
her years in government main components of the Scottish economy, for example
shipbuilding finally vanished due to privatizations.
’Mbid, 167 .
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At Icdst until 19*70 consensus policies hud mnnsgecl to deliver low inflation snd
low unemployment rates. These were in the order of about 1,5 per cent of the
workforce in the 1950s and 2 per cent in the 1960s and were in combination with
economic growth. Rising prosperity however, came to be considered a comparative
failure because in contrast to the UK the economies of many advanced nations grew
faster. The many ingredients the term ‘Thatcherism’ might include, one of them is
known as the “end of the consensus politics.”
Thatcher was not able to provide a better economic policy for Scotland and the
people started losing faith in her abilities to tackle the high unemployment rates. Of
course, this was not just true for Scotland, but for the whole UK, however it was
especially troublesome in Scotland, a nation which never was too eager to see a
Conservative administration in the first place. Thatcher’s abrasive personality -
“considered by many Scots to exhibit the worst traits of southern English
nationalism,” combined with unfavorable economic circumstances led to an increasing
distrust towards this government and the Conservative Party.’^ Increasingly, people in
Scotland questioned the position that Scotland held within the Union.
In other words, by being held in the union with such a tight grip the Scottish
people were starting to see their future more and more outside of the Union. The
number of Conservative MPs being elected in Scotland fell from 22 in 1979 to 10 in
1987, the last election of Thatcher, and the numbers continued to fall in the elections
to come. The dilemma for Scotland’s political situation is that the number of MPs is
Robert McCreadie, “Scottish Identity and the Constitution”, in Bernard
Crick, 46.
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usually not essential for having a majority in Westminster, as the Scotland is just too
small to play the same important role as England does in elections.
Nevertheless, the reduction in the numbers of Conservative MP’s started
discussions amongst Conservatives with regard to whether the regional policies of
'I'hatcher were indeed the way to go. In her memoirs she mentioned the factors that led
to diminishing support for the Conservative Party in Scotland: the identification of the
Conservative Party as an English party insensitive to Scottish issues and problems.
These factors, as she saw it, contributed to the 1987 result. Nevertheless, she claims
that during the 1980s the underlying Scottish economic problems started to improve.
As examples for that she cites the transformation of Edinburgh as a financial center.
Then, the oil industry continued to grow, and, as Thatcher remembers, it was
unfortunate that unemployment had started to fall in Scotland only four month before
the 1987 election. She defended the overall policies conducted by her administration
as they were “nevertheless in the long term good for Scotland.”’'^ In a speech she
stressed the values Great Britain as a united state holds: “Scottish values are Tory
values - and vice versa. The values of hard work, self-reliance, thrift, enterprise - the
relishing of challenges, the seizing of opportunities.”’^ Although 1'hatcher liked to call
the Conservative Party as the one and only Unionist Party, “the Thatcherite
programme and style of the Thatcher government, particularly the personalities and
the attitudes of Thatcher herself and most of her ministers were seen as profoundly
English, dominated by English concerns.”’*^
Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Slreel Years, (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 618-619.
Margaret Thatcher, The Revival of Britain. Speeches on Home and European Affairs
1975-1988
(complied by Alistair Cooke), (London: Auruni, 1989), 247-8.
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3.5.2. Poll Tax
There is one episode within the Conservatives years in Downing Street which
warrants special attention. The introduction of a new tax policy proved to have an
impact on the national identity of the Scottish people which would in the end be a
crucial element in the resultant downfall of the Tories: the poll tax (or ‘community
charge’).
Thatcher and a considerable number of her supporters had a long-standing
personal commitment to the abolition of the rating system. The debacle over
government funding, which had reached its climax with the struggle over rate capping,
suggested to many ministers that a review of the rates (the locally differentiated
property tax) was long overdue. This was true not just for England, but also for
Scotland and Wales. In 1981 a Paper had been set out alternatives to the domestic rate,
including a sales tax, a local income tax, and a poll tax. After much debate the poll tax
emerged as the favored option. The simple reason behind that decision was a re-
evaluation which took place in Scotland in 1985; the results were that households most
likely to vote Labour were faced with the steepest increases, as they tend to be poorer.
The 1986 Green Paper Payingfor Local Government set out the reform package. The
domestic rates were to be replaced by the ‘community charge’ or better known as the
‘Poll Tax,’ a flat-rate tax set by each local authority and payable by every adult.
The new poll tax system was supposed to foster a direct relationship between
the citizens and the local authority, which could determine its own, local rate of the
poll tax.’^ The Tories expected that the people would hold the local councilors
more
’’ David King, ‘Government Beyond Whitehall: Local Government and Urban
Politics’, in Patrick
Dunleavy, 197.
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accountable, as they would be able to see how the money was being spent. The
thought behind it was the following: if the taxpayer is aware of what services cost per
head and then they had to pay the amount, the people would be more likely to hold
their councilor to account. Being able to compare the price-performance ratio of other
councils and regions, the Conservatives hoped that the citizens would demand better
services, in particular Labour-run councils. Thatcher was convinced that the
Conservative councilors would be seen as being responsible managers of public
money and would therefore gain in elections.
The reform was introduced after the Conservatives gained their third term of
office in 1987. Despite strong opposition from other parties but also from the public
service and also citizens, the new package was initiated first of all in Scotland
beginning on the 4*'’ of April (start-date of the financial year in the UK) 1989-90. In
England and Wales however, the tax was introduced one year after Scotland, from the
year 1 990-9 1
.
(The reason that the reforms were not introduced in Northern Ireland
was the fear of the potential impact in an already-tense political environment.)
In reality, the poll tax contributed only one-third of local authority revenue.
Hence it was impossible for residents to oversee the budget, as too many factors came
into play, not only the Poll Tax. Indeed if residents were able to assess the cost of local
services, the result would not necessarily be that they would vote out the high-
spending councilors. The results of local elections on 1 May 1990 suggested that this
was not the case. The elections were not held nationwide, but 26m people were asked
to elect 5,198 council seats. Even though it was expected that the Conservatives
would
be devastated by the outcome, the results were ‘only’ disappointing
for the
Vivien Lowndes, “The other governments of Britain: local politics and
delegated administrations”, in
Ian Budge, 143
Conservatives, as Labour was not able to gain as much ground as they anticipated.
They gained 42 per cent of the vote (against 31 per cent for the Conservatives).
Nevertheless the Conservatives were able to gain some seats in London.
And that the local authorities complained about an administrative nightmare of
up-dating the registers and sending out hundreds of thousands of individual bills, did
not help to underline the Conservatives’ image of a party providing small government
and efficiency within the public services.
And then there was the main argument; the inequality. Is it fair that a
millionaire pays the same amount as a nurse does? Aside from local authorities, the
public was making its dissatisfaction with the poll tax known through national and
local demonstrations and a widespread campaign of non-payment. Some people in
Scotland, for example, publicly burned their tax notifications. The “refusal of payment
was justified not merely on the grounds of social justice common to the whole of
Britain,” as Aughey sees it, “it was also justified on the basis that it was an imposition
against the will of the Scottish people.”’^
The poll tax was, in the eyes of the Scottish people jet another, terrible mistake
by the Conservative government which served the purpose of increasing their sense of
distance from London and being full members of a Union. The British political elite is
“extraordinarily metrocentric,” as Simon James sees it: The further away from
’’ Arthur Aughey, 139.
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London the problem is, the less it seems to matter, and for many purposes Scotland is
seen almost as a foreign country.”*®
Had the cabinet looked north of the border in 1989 they would have seen the
various problems which rapidly developed. Most dramatically were the riots in
London of 31 March 1991, as King reports it: “In a period of eight hours, after a
march organized under the auspices of the ‘Anti-Poll Tax Federation,’ rioters looted
250 shops, overturned and burned vehicles and staged running battles with the
police.” The Guardian reported on its front page on 2 April 1990 that “sixty-eight
people will appear in court today after Saturday’s [31 March 1990] poll tax riots in
central London.” In the same issue it reported that 26m people, 73 per cent of all
adults in England and Wales will pay more poll tax than they paid under the former
system. The Labour party placed an ad on the front page of that issue stating: “The
poll tax. It’s beyond a joke”.
The following days also carried unwelcome news for the Conservatives:
“Shares and sterling fell heavily yesterday as the City reacted nerv'ously to the
poll tax riot in Trafalgar Square. (...) The fragility of the pound was underlined by the
response to the clashes between police and demonstrators, which were shown on
prime-time television in the United States.”
(The Guardian, 3 April 1990)
And:
“The government was under mounting pressure last night to make more
Poll
Tax concessions in Scotland after new figures revealed the scale
of non-payment to be
Simon James, British government, a reader in policy making,
(London; New York; Routledge, 1997),
152-159.
much higher than forecast. Council leaders bluntly told the Scottish Secretary,
Malcolm Rifkind, that their authorities would face a financial crisis later this year if
non-payment remained at its present level of up to 20 per cent.
In a report to the ministers, the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities
(Colsa) calculated that two month ago 850,000 Scots had either not paid the tax, or
were well behind. Of these, almost 400,000 had been sent legal warrants by the
sheriffs’ officers (bailiffs) acting for councils, while a further 450,000 were at the
‘final notice stage’ of debt recovery. Alarmingly for the councils, there appears to have
been no significant improvements since January.”
(The Guardian, 7 April 1990)
From the perspective of the Scottish people, the most outrageous part of the
whole poll tax episode would appear to have been the introduction of that tax one year
before it was implemented within the rest of Britain. The impression taking hold
amongst the Scots was that Scotland was used as a testing ground for new tax policies,
which, of course, was not appreciated by the Scots, nor was it seen as being a wise
political move from Thatcher and her government. However, as Gamble stresses, “this
accusation [of a test base] was only partly true - the real reason for the early shift to
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poll tax was the urgent need to introduce something to replace the rates”.
Nevertheless, Gamble admits “once the government has lost its legitimacy and trust it
is very difficult to regain them.” For the Tories it proved to be not just very difficult,
but at least within the remaining years of the twentieth century, impossible to regain
the trust amongst the Scottish electorate.
D. King, in Patrick Dunleavy, 197.
Andrew Gamble, in Patrick Dunleavy, 79.
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The Thatcher era demonstrated a departure from the Conservative Party’s
traditional approach to Scottish government. Historically the party had positioned
itself in line with the union-state tradition in the government of Scotland. In contrast,
under Thatcher the Conservative Party at Westminster repositioned itself politically as
much less sympathetic to diversity and the Union-state tradition in the government.
Being aware of the political climate in Scotland, there was probably little she could
have done anyhow about the increase of nationalist sentiment, particularly in Scotland.
Needless to say Thatcher herself believes that to be so. Thatcher also believed that the
overall approach of her government to Scotland was correct, but went even further, as
Bradbury notes: “Thatcher, [...], decided that the Scottish problem existed not because
of too much exposure to her politics but rather too little; and that the Thatcher
approach should be promoted more positively with an intensification of reform and
emphasis on its benefits in order to convert the Scottish electorate to a Thatcherite
outlook.”^^
For as long as Margaret Thatcher remained leader, and also too when John
Major took over as Prime Minister, the Conservative Party rejected any sort of
political devolution whatsoever. In a speech to the Scottish conference in May 1988
she defined that policy as “devolution to the people themselves: devolution of housing,
devolution of education [which was, in fact, already devolved since the Union],
devolution of share-ownership and devolution of State-run industries to individuals [a
different way to describe privatization].” She concludes: “Nationalization
took
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companies out of Scottish hands and into Whitehall, privatization will hand them back
to Scotland.”
3.5.3. Major
The poll tax disaster brought the Conservatives finally to the conclusion that it
was time to look for a new leader. This new leader was to be John Major. However,
when Major became Prime Minister in 1990 there appeared little change concerning
the union question. Both Major governments continued with the Thatcher regime of
privatization, deregulation and administrative reforms. In March 1993 the Major
government released a White Paper, “Scotland in the Union - A partnership for
Good.” This paper detailed the existing special benefits for the Union of Scotland,
with regard to the economy, parliamentary business, the law, and the advantages of the
Scottish Office and devolved administration. Measures for promoting Scottish interest
in Europe were also emphasized. The Scottish Office was itself to be more visible in
Scotland, with information points in all major towns and cities.
The overall message from the Conservatives was that Scotland’s interests
would be more clearly heard within a Scottish parliament. However, “Scotland in the
Union” sought to amplify further the Government’s continuing commitment to a
traditional unionism. In other words, the Major government failed to realize that it was
probably already too late at that point to place the union above everything else. The
dissatisfaction amongst the Scottish people was just too great to follow a policy of no
change when it came to the question of devolved bodies, and, of course, perhaps most
Margaret Thatcher, 1989; 245
importantly, it did not help that the Major administration was a Conservative one in
the first place. Given that they had gained little support at the election in Scotland,
after more than ten years of ‘Thatcherism’ few in Scotland expected there to be any
fundamental changes from a different Tory Prime Minister, whatever that person
might say or do.
The Conservatives were striving to recover their position in Scotland and to
regain support as well as being able to appeal to lost voters. The Secretary of State
under Major, Michael Forsyth engaged in “symbolic gestures,” as Mitchell observes:
“He literally put on a kilt to attend the Scottish premiere of the film Braveheart and
returned the Stone of Destiny to Scotland. But all of this was too little, too late. It
highlighted rather than reversed an image of the Conservatives as anti-Scottish.”*^
This failure to address serious issues and concerns of the Scottish people, rather than
becoming caught up in superficial public relations exercises would damage them
irrevocably.
When summing up the years of the Conservatives under Thatcher and Major
from the Scottish perspective: there is little to praise. The concept of the Union, so
desperately upheld especially by Thatcher but also by Major has de facto been the
reason as to why its power base began to diminish. As stated above, it was probably
the most unpleasant political experience for the Scottish people for many years. A
party which does not take into consideration the Scottish political attitude and culture,
which does not pay attention to specific Scottish needs, nor which will reconsider
its
James Mitchell, “From National Identity to Nationalism
1945-99”; in Harry T. Dickinson, 162.
attitude when the numbers of Conservative MP’s in Scotland begin to dwindle, is a
party destined to lose the Scottish electorate for the years to come.
At this point it is necessary to jump in time once more. 1'he Major government
has left Whitehall in 1 997, but besides the two Conservative Prime Ministers who had
undoubtedly influence of the national consciousness of the Scots, there have also been
other factors which have to subsequently been shown to have influenced the Scottish
people. It is hence necessary to go back to the early 1 980s, where a group of
‘devolvers’ started to build upon the rubble of the lost referendum of 1 979.
3.6. The Campaign for a Scottish Assembly
The Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA) was an all-party group - though
neither the Conservatives nor the Scottish National Party initially wanted to participate
- which in the first instance began quietly to establish a concept for devolution. In
1 98 1 it published a “Blueprint for Scotland,” which set up a proposal for Devolution.
Its overall purpose, however, “was the revival of the home-rule movement [which]
focused on the creation of a constitutional convention,” as Brand and Mitchell recall.
At the beginning the CSA did not receive great public attention, “it was hardly noticed
for a number of years.”*^ The CSA stressed the need to achieve a consensus of opinion
behind an Assembly scheme; it was therefore intended to include as many political
and social players as possible.
** Jack Brand and James Mitchell, “Home Rule in Scotland; The Politics and Bases of a Movement”, in
Jonathan Bradbury and John Maweson, 43.
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In the following years “the CSA continued its policy of quiet lobbying,
drawing praise for its persistence but apparently achieving very little.”** The CSA, in
the middle of the 1980s, decided to get more concrete. Through either elected or
nominated members the CSA would become a Constitutional Convention. At the
beginning, just like in 1979, Labour was rather cautious, but “the crucial change came
with the revival of Labour party interest in home rule from the late 1 980s,”brought
about by increasing pressure from electoral gains made by the SNP.*^
Labour’s policy at that time was undecided with regard to devolution, and it
wanted to keep its options open. Hence Labour official position was that a Convention
was not necessary, because a Labour government would be formed after the election
with a commitment to establish a Scottish Assembly anyway.^®
Labour did not win the elections, and the Conservatives began their third
successive government, here under Thatcher. Following the return of the
Conservatives in 1987 the CSA decided to establish a Constitutional Steering
Committee. The Committee’s report, “A Claim of Right for Scotland,” was published
in July 1988.
The report clearly stressed Scotland’s status as a nation. It also included a
condemnation of UK governments for neglecting the spirit of the “Treaty of the
Union” - by many Scots considered to be the basis on Scotland’s status up until today
within the United Kingdom. The legitimacy of the Assembly was viewed as though
there would have been no other option. The so-called ‘British’ Constitution came in
^’’Robert McCreadie, “Scottish Identity and the Constitution”, in Bernard Crick, 48.
*"jack Brand and James Mitchell, “Home Rule in Scotland; The Politics and Bases of a
Movement”, in
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for particular criticism: it was in fact an English Constitution which, far from
protecting parliamentary democracy, had concentrated political powers in the hands of
one person, the Prime Minister, to a degree that was unequaled in any other western
society, and failed to provide any clear or binding constitutional limitations on the
exercise of that power. In these circumstances the Scots could not expect to be given
any constitutional opportunity for self-determination and they would therefore have to
take matters into their own hands. In the late 1980s the Assembly recommended the
establishment of a Constitutional Convention to act as a focus of resistance to
Westminster government and as a forum for drawing up a new constitution for
Scotland.
3.7. The Scottish Constitutional Convention
The aim of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, SCC, was to translate what
appeared to be widespread support for devolution into proposals for legislation. The
SCC met for the first time in March 1989. At the time, the recommendation that there
should be a Constitutional Convention struck a responsive chord with one of the main
reasons being the fiasco of the Poll Tax. But also other policies of the Tories let the
members of the Convention believe that they are doomed to live with a government
which cared little for their interest. “Only devolution,” as Bogdanor puts it, “could
protect Scotland and Wales against future outbursts of ‘Thatcherism’.”^^ But that was
about all that the members of the Convention were able to agree upon. It did not take
long until party politics started to slow the Convention’s work down. The Scottish
” A Claim ofRight for Scotland, (Edinburgh; Campaign fora Scottish Assembly, 1988)
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National Party, already committed to setting up a directly elected Convention in the
hope of winning an outright majority, agreed to support it. So too did various
influential bodies. Although the Scottish people did not elect the Convention, it
contained large parts of Scottish public opinion, which included not only Labour and
the Liberal Democrats, but also bodies such as the Scottish Trade Union Congress, the
Scottish Convention of Local Authorities and all the Scottish churches.’^ The Scottish
Conservatives, however, refused - not very surprisingly - to have anything to do with
the Convention. The Labour Party in Scotland, mindful of its leading role in Scottish
political life and acutely aware that a Constitutional Convention might be exploited by
the SNP, swallowed its doubts and also agreed to participate.
At the same time as the setting up of the SCC, in November 1988, came the
famous Govan by-election. In a sensational result the SNP candidate, former Labour
MP Jim Sillars, overturned a Labour majority of more than 19,000 votes, leaving the
Conservatives with 2,000 votes and gave a completely unexpected boost to the
Committee’s recommendation and the role of the SNP within the Convention.’"* The
SNP victory however was double-edged for supporters of the Convention. It forced the
constitutional question to the fore, but the battle for votes between the SNP and
Labour was bitter and made any co-operation almost impossible.
A cross-party meeting to discuss the membership and remit of the Convention
was quickly arranged for the end of January 1989, and it seemed at long last that the
desire for a consensus might stop the disagreements between Labour and the SNP. The
SNP, however, always a rather troublesome member of the Convention, complained
Vemon Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), 196.
Ibid: 197
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that its representation within the SCC was too low, hence it was not actually reflecting
the will of the people of Scotland. Rather the SNP wanted it to be elected, and it also
blamed that the Convention should propose a referendum concerning independence for
Scotland. This referendum could have given the Scottish electorate the decision
whether it wanted to retain the status quo or independence. As this was not on the
agenda of the SCC, the SNP started to withdraw from the Convention. This step
sought to increase the pressure on the SCC and even questioned its legitimacy. The
SNP might have also hoped that its withdrawal would to break down the whole
Convention. This proved not to be the case.
The Scottish media critized the decision of the SNP to withdraw from the
Convention. Labour, although divided about the Convention, found its freedom
restricted by the pressure of public opinion; it therefore decided to remain involved.
Other reasons to remain in the Convention was partly to gain at the SNP’s expense and
partly to influence the Convention, and therefore to ensure that it was able to control
the decisions which were undertaken.
At the end of March 1989, the Convention held its first meeting in Edinburgh.
At this meeting, virtually all of the Scottish members of the Westminster and
European parliaments, and representatives of the Labour Party in Scotland, Scottish
Liberal Democrats, Social Democratic Party, Co-operative Party, Communist Party,
Scottish Green Party and the Orkney and Shetland Movement (but still not the SNP
and the Conservatives), joined with representatives of the trade unions, the churches,
the local authorities, and the Gaelic and ethnic communities in adopting a founding
Declaration which acknowledged “the sovereign right of the Scottish people to
John E. Kingdom, Government and politics in Britain, An Introduction (Cambridge;
Polity Press,
1991 ), 92 -93 .
determine the form of government best suited to their needs.”’^ The declaration
committed the Convention to agreeing a scheme for an Assembly or Parliament,
obtaining the approval of the Scottish people for it and thereafter asserting their right
to secure its implementation.
When it came time to choose the electoral system for the new parliament, the
easy choice could have been the ‘single member constituency’ or ‘first-past-the-post’
system, as it is also known. It is the same way in which the people in the rest of the
U.K. elect their House of Commons. The electoral system is to high degree
responsible for the amount of political parties playing an influential role in a given
political system. A ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPTP) system tends to foster a two party
system. This is the case in the United States, with just two political parties acting
within the political organs of the government: the Republicans and the Democrats.
However, there are some few independent Congressman, Senators and Governors, but
the overall number is small.
A proportional system, in contrast, usually allows several parties to participate
within the political arenas like parliaments. Examples would be the Netherlands or
Germany, where several parties simultaneously represent the electorate. An
establishment of a government is then most often only possible when at least two
parties build a coalition to obtain a majority.
In Britain, the parliament in Westminster is elected through the FPTP system.
Therefore, based on the history of this system, the British system is often viewed as a
“natural” two party system.’^ If one takes a closer look at Westminster, the differences
between the United States and the United Kingdom become obvious. Despite the fact
’’ Robert McCreadie, “Scottish Identity and the Constitution,” in Bernard Crick,
50.
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that the same electoral system is being used, the British electorate tends to vote more
than just the two ‘big’ political parties. Ever since the general election of February
1974 it becomes obvious that the House of Commons is somewhat different in terms
of representation of the electorate’s will then the House of Representatives. In this
election a total of 37 MPs have been sent to the parliament and were not members of
either the Conservatives or Labour.
Drucker’s book of 1977 suggested that the 1974 general election is evidence
that Britain’s party system had to become ‘multi-party,’ instead of two-party.’’ The
combined Conservative-Labour vote is able to show this trend. From a total of 96.8
per cent in 1951 it has decreased into the range of 70 per cent in the 1990s.’*
The reason for choosing a different system for the elections to the Scottish
parliament, as explained below, becomes clear when one examines the voting behavior
of the Scots and, by doing so, considers how an elected body might form. It is clear
that the parties involved in the process of devolving, mainly of course Labour and to
some extent the Liberal Democrats, wished to have a system, which favors their
interests and therefore brings with it the highest number of seats possible. The Liberal
Democrats have advocated proportional representation in the U.K. since 1922, as they
have been consistently underrepresented in Westminster in comparison to the actual
percentage of votes which they have achieved in elections.
The most significant agreement therefore - and at that time also the most
controversial one - of the Convention was the agreement for a different electoral
system than that at Westminster. The proposals for a move away from the current
Henry M. Drucker (ed). Multi Party Britain (London: Macmillan: 1977)
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system were high on the agenda of the Liberal Democrats. They made it very clear at
the outset that their continuing participation in the Convention depended upon
agreement being reached on a system of proportional representation (PR) for elections
to a Scottish parliament. They had long preferred the Single Transferable Vote, the
system used for the election to the European Parliament and local government election
in Northern Ireland, as well as in the Republic of Ireland and various other European
countries. The Labour Party in Scotland, on the other hand, was somewhat opposed to
that system, the reason being that the FPTP system continued to work in its favor; with
just 42 per cent of the popular vote it controlled 50 of the 72 Scottish Westminster
seats, 7 of the 8 European seats and most of urban Scotland’s regional and district
councils. Nevertheless there was a mood within the Convention in favor of change and
there were also influential activists within the Labour Party in Scotland and the trade
unions who argued that FPTP should be abandoned in favor of PR because FPTP
worked to Labour’s disadvantage in UK parliamentary elections. The Conventions
final report stated that the electoral results should be “broadly related” to the number
of votes cast.^^
Although Labour knew that under a PR system they would still be the largest
party in the Parliament, when considering the likely outcomes of future elections, a PR
system would have the effect that Labour would most probably have to reach out for a
partner in order to form a coalition to ensure a collective majority. With this
perspective it was of course not easy to convince the members of the Labour party of a
Robert Garner and Richard Kelly, British Political Parties Today, (Manchester;
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system different to the well-known FPTP. But the most pragmatic reason of all, even
though unlikely, is that a FPTP system could turn against Labour. The Labour party
was fully aware of the potential for a landslide-victory for any party above a certain
percentage of votes in a FPTP system. They themselves had experienced a landslide
victory in the general election of 1997. In Scotland, the SNP, as the second-biggest
party after Labour, could be a potential candidate for such a victory. If one day the
Scottish electorate, for whatever reason, should turn against Labour and towards SNP,
the dilemma could not be any greater for any other party. It wouldn’t take much, and
the FPTP system could suddenly provide the SNP close or perhaps even over 50 per
cent of the seats in the parliament. The SNP has already made it clear that a 50 per
cent majority of Scottish MPs or MSPs, in any election and under any system, would
give them the justification to move forward towards independence and prepare a
referendum.
This threat alone would be enough for the Labour party to back off from a
FPTP system and towards a PR system. The reason for that is because there might be
the chance that one day it might not be Labour, but rather the SNP, who would secure
over 50 per cent of the seats. Under a PR or semi-PR system it is unlikely that any
party would gain such a majority. The party was aware that in a FPTP system, Labour,
in representing predominantly the central belt of Scotland, might gain an overall
majority of just 35 per cent of the vote; or, alternatively, that the SNP might gain an
overall majority on just over 35 per cent of the vote. The SNP could use that majority
in parliament to claim that the Scottish people had given them a mandate for
Towards Scotland's Parliament: a report to the Scottish people, by the Scottish
Constitutional
Convention (Edinburgh: The Convention, 1990)
independence. Under the proportional system, by contrast, the SNP would need to win
50 per cent of the vote to claim such a mandate.'®'
In the end the final choice was a system combining the FPTP and PR, to some
extent comparable with the German system. It is also the method that was
unanimously recommended by the Royal Commission on the Constitution for
elections, which supported proportional representation for the devolved assemblies.
The Commission also made it clear that “this conclusion is specific to regional
assemblies; we are not here concerned with the elections to the United Kingdom
parliament.”'®^
The electoral system for the elections to the Scottish Parliament is somewhat
complicated. First, the Scots elect 73 constituency members, based on the U.K.
parliament constituencies, using the FPTP system. They then elect a further 56
members, seven in each of the eight regions, based on the regions used in the
European Parliament elections. These members are elected using the ‘Additional
Member’ System. This is a proportional representation using party lists, which ensures
that each party’s representation in the Parliament reflects its overall share of the vote.
This means that one constituency MSP and seven regional MSPs represent every
Scottish resident.'®^ Therefore each Scot has eight MSPs representing their area in the
Scottish Parliament.
This is the main difference when compared to Germany’s system. The German
Bundestag is elected equally by both systems; 50 per cent of the German MPs are
elected through a list system and the seats are therefore proportional and the other 50%
through their constituency. In Scotland, we have 73 MSPs elected through their
Vernon Bogdanor, 196.
Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1969-1973, vol. 1, (London; H.M.S.O., 1973),
240.
constituency vs. 56 MSPs elected through the list system, on a scale of 100 a ratio of
57 to 43.
Financing the assembly proved a controversial matter in the late 1970s. At the
time, the Labour government proposed that the devolution would be financed entirely
by block grant. In the 1980s, Labour policy changed and it was agreed that a future
Scottish Parliament would have tax-raising powers in lieu of the equally distributed
block grant every region throughout the UK receives.'®'^ The 1990 proposals included
assigning certain more powerful legislature. It was claimed that this would “underline
the independence of the Parliament”. In the election campaign 2003 the SNP has
renewed their demand for full fiscal independence for Scotland.
Ever since the nationalists entered the political stage the question of financial
and economic merits of Scotland, was an important issue. The question whether
Scotland would be able to support itself without any contributions from London would
be a determinate factor in convincing the Scottish people that independence would be
feasible. It is one of the main issues where Nationalists and Conservatives disagree
strongly. Lynch writes: “Conservative politicians depicted Scotland as suffering from
a ‘dependency culture’ which saw (unsuccessful) state intervention. Government
bureaucracy and fiscal subsidization as the answer to its economic problems.”*”^ The
Tories have established the phrase “subsidy junkies” in the 1980s to refer to the
Scottish part of the budget.
these regional MSPs are send to parliament through the d’Hondt - divider method.
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One might think that this question is easily resolvable by establishing a balance
sheet on the paid taxes and the expenditure gained. The easiest and obvious way
would be to examine the expenditure taxes and the expenditure gained. The total
(identifiable) expenditure on services in the UK in the financial year 2000/01 was
£281.4 billion or £4,709 per head. England, Wales and Northern Ireland received
£226.4 billion, £28.4 billion, £15.6 billion and £10.9 billion, respectively. In the same
order that is per head: £4,529, £5,558, £5,302 and £6,424.'°’ These numbers
demonstrate that Scotland receives more than England and Wales per head, but less
than Northern Ireland. However, it is not so simple and depending on the political
interest, one would receive a variety of views on this. As Lee puts it: “As regard the
financial balance, it is clearly not possible to compute an exact net surplus or loss.
Neither the income nor expenditure records permit this. As far as tax payment is
concerned some categories are certainly determinate, such as income tax raised in
Scotland (...), and death duties. Taxes on corporate bodies, however, may not give a
clear indication of the source of their revenues, except in the extreme case of oil where
much of the activity lies in Scotland.”'®^ Lee illustrates that with an example of
expenditure taxes and whisky distilleries, of which are plenty in Scotland. The excise
duty on alcohol, which is high in the United Kingdom, will be passed on to the
customers, of whom some, but not all, live in Scotland. To make a clear calculation
taking all these elements into consideration is not possible. Another example would be
defense, some 20 per cent of the UK budget. Would an independent Scotland build up
their own armed forces or would they be able to save the Scottish share of these 20 per
Expenditure, such as defense and oversea aid, is not included
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cent and spend it in different sectors? Concerning the defense spending, in 1991 the
spending was estimated at £453 per head in the South East compared to £274 in
Scotland. With those given examples of excise duty and defense spending it becomes
clear that the establishment of a balance sheet is not that simple.
In the conclusions of his book, Lee states “there can be little doubt that
Scotland is an economy both large enough and prosperous enough to sustain an
independent existence within the framework of the European Union. Independence
should therefore be regarded as an entirely feasible option, both economically and
politically.”*'^^
Table 5: Responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament'*'*
Reserved powers (not devolved) Areas not reserved (devolved)
Common market for the UK
Constitution of the UK
Defence and national security
Fiscal, economic and monetary system
Foreign policy
Protection of Borders
Social security
Economic development
Education
Environment
Health
Housing
Law and home office
Local government
Table 5) shows some areas of policies that are reserved powers,
and those that
are devolved. Areas that provide a nation with a ‘face’ to the
outside world like
foreign policy are still in the hands of Westminster, but as
well as matters of the
constitution. Areas such as education, health and local
government are now in the
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hands of the Scottish Parliament. As mentioned earlier, in a devolved system the
devolved body has no say on the reserved matters. In the case of Scotland that means
that the parliament in Edinburgh has no influence on such vital issues like defense or
foreign policy. However, in recent weeks the SNP has demanded a vote in the Scottish
parliament on the imminent war against Iraq. The result will have no influence on the
decision of Westminster and the Prime Minister; it might however be a tool to increase
political pressure, as the Scottish parliament is as legitimate to represent the will of the
people as Westminster is.
The Convention also agreed on the recommendation that Orkney, Shetland and
the Western Isles, with their separate history and culture, should have devolved
legislative powers over matters directly affecting them, such as fishing and housing.
Even though the establishment of the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, and
later the Scottish Constitutional Convention, started their work quietly and with little
public attention, the interest has changed over the years in the 1980s and 1990s. As the
Conservatives continued to move out of alignment with the Scottish peoples’
perception of appropriate government, the cross-party conferences offered an
alternative. The constitutional guidelines that were set up demonstrated to the Scottish
electorate that devolution was indeed feasible.
At this point it would be appropriate to compare the political circumstances in
which the two referenda were held. On 1 March 1979, the Labour government was
disappointed with the outcome of the referendum. The main mistake had been that the
pro-devolutionists were poorly organized whereas the ‘no’ campaign had politically
strong support from various areas and from various parties. There was also a specific
‘no’ campaign within the highest ranks of the Labour party. Those Labour MP’s, who
were rejecting devolution, did not face any party discipline.'"
Why has the New Labour government in 1997 immediately started again where
they had been stopped: in looking for the possibility of a devolved nation? Why, even
with a majority of 179 in the House of Commons, was it worthwhile for Tony Blair
and New Labour to take that risk again?
That the political climate has changed irrevocably between the two
referendums is undeniable and obvious for every commentator. The fact that the
leadership of New Labour, namely, Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor of the
Exchequer Gordon Brown have been far more enthusiastic with regard to devolution
long before their victory in 1997 has helped it to be on the agenda. But the political
pressure was far stronger to ensure that the proposals of the Scottish Constitutional
Convention were followed as closely as possible. The attitude change of Labour is
therefore surely one of the main differences between the first referendum of 1979 and
the one in 1997. The overall problem was not just the backbenchers of Labour, the
main problem was that throughout the 1960s and well into the 1970s Labour was still
operating under the assumption that the United Kingdom has to be seen as a unitary
state."^ In Mitchell’s words, “the reconciliation of the unitary state view with
devolution proved difficult”.
The main difference in comparing the two referenda was that the 1997
referendums were held before the substantive legislation was presented to parliament
Geoffrey Evans and Dafydd Trystan, “Why was 1997 different? A comparative analysis of voting
behaviour in the 1997 and 1996 Welsh campaign”, in Bridget Taylor and Katarina
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and not after the bills had received legislative approval. As the outlines of devolution
have been established beforehand by the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly and the
Scottish Constitutional Convention, their work only needed to be rephrased and put
into a bill. (This also explains that New Labour, still within their political honeymoon,
was able to conduct the referendums within months after their election.) This meant
that, based on the assumption that the outcomes will be positive, they could
demonstrate the will of the Scottish and Welsh people, and therefore could be a less
vulnerable recipient of a potential backbench rebellion.
The Scottish electorate has also changed in respect of their attitude towards
devolution between 1979 and 1997. The analysis of the results shows that there were
divisions between social groups in 1979. As Surridge and D. McCrone analyze, “those
who were broadly middle-class voted ‘no’ in 1979”."^ Eighteen years later those
divisions were not there any longer and the only group to vote ‘no’ were the followers
of the Conservative Party.
In the 1970s, “the main reason for Labour’s ‘U-tum’ on devolution when it
moved from opposing the policy to supporting it,” as Mitchell puts it, “was the
electoral threat posed by the SNP.”**'’ Twenty years later, the SNP is still a threat, but
Labour support for devolution “has become far more positive” and today Labour is
seeing the whole movement of establishing devolved bodies less as a threat to the
Union than they did twenty years ago.
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In the 1997 referendum the people of Scotland and then, a week later, the
people in Wales were asked whether they wanted to have their own legislature. 74.3
per cent of the Scots voted to establish a parliament, the slim majority of 50.3 per cent
of the Welsh voted to have their own assembly. The reason for waiting a week in-
between the two votes was that the Welsh opinion might be influenced by a favorable
result in Scotland.”^ That might indeed have swayed the outcome, since the result was
a very narrow victory for devolution by less than 7.000 votes out of over a million
casts, on a turnout ofjust over 50 per cent (vs. 62.9 per cent in Scotland).
One year later, in 1998, the people of Northern Ireland and the people of the
Republic of Ireland were asked to vote on the same kind of question. In Northern
Ireland 71.1 per cent agreed, in the Republic an overwhelming 94.3 per cent wanted an
assembly for their northern neighbors.
The parliament/ assemblies were placed in the political centers of the three
regions. These are Edinburgh with 450.000, Cardiff with 300.000 and Belfast with
300.000 inhabitants.
Vernon Bogdanor, 196.
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CHAPTER 4
NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN NUMBERS
At this point it would be pertinent to examine how the concept of national
identity in Scotland shows itself and what sort of characteristics it has. One must,
when doing this, take into account that subjective feelings are difficult to study and
measure. Nationalism is no less difficult to put in figures or explain. Given this fact,
the existence of a dual national identity in Scotland makes the analysis of national
identity even more complex. Scottish people may feel part of the Scottish community
while also feeling loyal to the British state and nation. Cultural and political events
will influence feelings of national identity at different times.
The Scottish identity appears strong when we compare it with identities in the
other regions of Britain. In 1992, only 31 per cent of the respondents living in England
chose to describe themselves as English, 63 per cent as British. Of Welsh respondents,
55 per cent considered themselves Welsh and 34 per cent British."^ However, caution
is necessary when comparing these numbers. The English identity might exist as a
‘sub-identity’ of the British identity, but not necessarily in the same way or to the
same degree as the Scottish identity. In England, the terms ‘England’ and ‘English’ are
often used as synonyms for ‘Britain’ and ‘British’. This is also true the other way: the
terms ‘Britain’ and ‘British’ are in use when actually the term ‘England’ is meant. The
confusion surrounding these words is not helpful when it comes to defining national
identity. Therefore one has to take into consideration that for a certain number of
Lynn G. Bennie and James Mitchell, How Scotland votes (Manchester; Manchester University Press,
1997 ), 133 .
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English the necessary distinction between ‘English’ and ‘British’ are not as obvious as
they might be for the Scots and the Welsh.
Table 6: Scottish and British identity in Scotland, 1992 and 1997,
Moreno Scale"’
1992 1997
Scottish not British 19 28
More Scottish than British 40 35
Equally Scottish and British 33 29
More British than Scottish 3 3
British not Scottish 3 3
None of these/ d. k./ other 2 2
Numbers asked 957 2307
As these numbers above suggest, there has been a notable increase from 1 9 per
cent (1992) to 28 per cent (1997) within just five years in the numbers of Scottish
people who identify themselves as being solely Scottish, not British. Combined with
the number of people who consider themselves more Scottish than British, we find that
well over 50 per cent identify strongly with Scotland. The cause of this increase has
many reasons, but the dissatisfaction with the Conservative government in London and
its disinterest in problems facing Scotland is certainly an important one. The October
1974 election and subsequent elections changed the political landscape of Scotland
considerably. Since then, the Conservatives have always come third in elections, after
Labour and the SNP, and in the 1990s even fourth, behind the Liberal Democrats. One
should not forget that since the Conservatives took over power in Westminster in 1979
under Prime Minister Thatcher, issues like devolution were not on the political agenda
named after its author
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at all. This was also true for her successor, Prime Minister John Major, coming to
power in 1990.
The results of the election might have changed the Conservatives’ attitude
towards Scotland, as they saw that there was nothing to gain anyway. One might get
the impression that the Conservatives have ‘written’ Scotland off as a part of the UK
that will not vote for them whatsoever. Thatcher’s and Major’s thoughts on Scotland’s
demand for devolution would result in practical conclusions. Why should the
Conservative party change if, a) they will not get a great number of MP’s out of
Scotland and b) the overall number usually is not important for a majority in
Westminster? With a clear commitment to a strong union the Conservatives might
have hoped to gain greater support in England, even on the costs of losing out on votes
from Scotland. The proof of their attitude is evidenced in the electoral outcome of the
general elections in 1997, where the Scottish Conservatives were devastated by the
results of the Scottish voters. This sort of attitude of the Tories that Scotland,
whatsoever, stands united against the Conservatives, might well have led to an
increase of nationalistic feelings among the Scottish people and the electorate.
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Table 7: Forced-choice ‘best identity’, 1979-1999, (%)“’
1979 1992 1997
(Election)
1997
(Referendum)
1999
Scottish 56 72 72 85 77
British 38 25 24 15 17
Sample size (=100%) 661 957 882 676 1,482
Don’t know and not answered included in the base.
Data based on: Scottish Election Surveys of 1979, 1992 and 1997; Scottish Referendum Survey of
1997; Scottish Parliamentary Election Survey of 1999.
Changes can be best seen in the ‘forced-choice’ categories of ‘best identity’.
Back in 1979, the people seeing themselves as ‘Scottish’ already outnumbered those
seeing themselves as ‘British’ by 56 per cent vs. 38 per cent. By 1992, only a quarter
considered themselves ‘British’, and almost three-quarters ‘Scottish’. The peak was
reached in 1997, just when the referendum had been held. Those who prioritized being
British were reduced to around one in six, whereas eight out of ten said they were
Scottish. The table suggests that the referendum provoked an intensification of
‘Scottishness’, and that this was maintained in the 1999 Scottish parliamentary
election. Though the numbers have just slightly adjusted to levels seen some years
before these events, the overall picture is that the constitutional changes have surely
fostered an increase in people seeing themselves as being Scottish.
Lindsay Paterson (et al.), New Scotland. New Politics? (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2001), 105.
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Table 8: National identity by nation 120
Scotland Wales England
X not British 23 13 8
More X than British 38 29 16
Equally X and British 27 26 46
More British than X 4 10 15
British not X 4 7 6
None of these 4 7 6
sample size (=100%) 882 182 255
Source: British Election Study 1997
Even though these numbers are slightly different from the ones above, the
overall trend is visible. What is obviously visible is that the people in Scotland identify
more closely with their own country than with Britain in comparison with the people
in England and Wales; the English give a lower priority to being English than either
the Welsh or the Scottish do. The majority of English identify themselves equally with
England and Britain.
Table 9: Support for various constitutional options, 1979-2000
1997 1992 1997 1997 1999 2000
(election) (referendum)
Independence
outwith Europe
7*
6 8 9 10 11
Independence
in Europe 17 18 28 18 19
strong domestic
parliament** 26
50**
42 32 50 47
weak domestic
parliament** 28 9 9 9 8
no elected bodv 26 24 17 17 10 12
sample size (= 100%) 729 957 882 676 1482 1665
David McCrone, “Who Are We?; Understanding Scottish Identity”, in Catherine Domenico, et
al.,
(eds). Boundaries and Identities: Nation. Politics and Culture in Scotland
{Dundee: University of
Abertay Press 2001), 17.
Scottish Affairs, no. 40, Summer 2000
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* No distinction was made between the two types of independence in 1979.
** Strong domestic parliament was referred to in 1979 as ‘Scottish Assembly which would handle most
Scottish affairs’, and from 1997 onwards as ‘Scottish Parliament within the UK with some taxation
powers’. Weak domestic parliament was referred to in 1979 as ‘Scottish Assembly which would handle
some Scottish affairs and would be responsible to Parliament at Westminster’, and from 1997 onwards
as ‘Scottish Parliament within the UK with no taxation powers’. No distinction was made in 1992.
Don’t know and not answered included in the base.
Data based on: Scottish Election Surveys of 1979, 1992 and 1997; Scottish Referendum Survey of
1997; Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys of 1999 and 2000.
This table shows the change in attitude of the people in Scotland towards the
various constitutional options between 1997 and 2000. The support for independence
started in 1997 with rather low support: only 7 per cent. By 1992, after a decade of
Conservative government and ‘Thatcherism’, that number had grown to around a
quarter. In the referendum of 1997, nearly all independence supporters voted for a
devolved parliament: according to the Scottish Referendum Survey, 96 per cent of
people who supported either of the independence options voted in favor of a
parliament. After the parliament was actually established in 1999, the new institution
became the most popular option: around 50 per cent in support.
The ways in which correlations between national identity and voting views
inter-relate are seen below.
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Table 10; Percentage of national identifiers and favored constitutional change, 1997
Independent of Britain
Scottish More Scottish Equal More British British
and Europe 14 6 2 3 4
Independent in Europe 31 19 10 6 0
Assembly (devolution) 42 58 50 39 54
No change 13 17 38 52 42
The outcome of the percentage of national identifiers (Scottish, more Scottish,
etc.) and favored constitutional change is not very surprising. We have the highest
numbers of people who identify themselves as either ‘Scottish’ or ‘more Scottish’
when it comes to ‘Independent of Britain and Europe’ - 20 per cent, ‘Independent in
Europe’ - 50 per cent, and ‘Assembly’ - 100 per cent. Of the people who see
themselves as either ‘more British’ or ‘British’ we find a tendency to either agree on
an Assembly - 93 per cent, or to have no change at all - 94 per cent.
However, even amongst those who describe themselves as ‘Scottish’ as the
national identity, only 31 per cent favor the independence-model of the SNP;
‘Independent in Europe’. More than 10 percentage points (42 per cent) favor an
‘Assembly’ over ‘Independent in Europe’ (31 per cent). One could conclude that from
this even those who are ‘Scottish’ do not necessarily follow the call of the SNP for
independence.
Lynn G. Bennie and James Mitchell, 140.
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Table 1 1 : Identification with an area'^^
"When asked which two or three of these, if any, would you say most identify
with, the answers were asfollows (per cent); ”
This local community
Britain England Scotland Wales
41 42 39 32
This region 50 49 62 50
England/Scotland/Wales 45 41 72 81
Britain 40 43 18 27
Europe 16 17 1
1
16
Commonwealth 9 10 5 3
Global Community 8 9 5 2
Don’t know 2 2 1 0
This is a rather interesting table, which allows us to compare a) Britain with the
three nations of Scotland, Wales and England, and b) to compare them with each
other. Here region is referred as areas like the Highlands or the Lake District.
‘This local community’ is mentioned mostly in England with 42 per cent and,
on the other end, Wales with 32 per cent. ‘This region’, the next larger category, is still
in the range of +/ - 1 0 per cent throughout Britain, though we already see an increase
in Scotland and Wales compared to ‘this local community’. Interesting to note is the
third category ‘England/Scotland/Wales’. Whereas England records a slight drop
down to 41 per cent, the Scottish refer to this category with 72 per cent, and - rather
surprisingly - Wales leads here with 81 per cent. The next crucial category is ‘Britain’.
No surprise here: England has the highest identification with Britain (43 per cent),
Scotland falls down to 18 per cent and Wales is somewhat in the middle with 27 per
cent.
In the last categories of ‘Europe’, ‘Commonwealth’, and ‘Global Community’,
the numbers are all at a rather low level, though the category ‘Europe’ gets a higher
rating of the English than from either the Scottish and the Welsh. It should be
mentioned that usually England is referred to be anti-European whereas Scotland (and
Alex Wright, Scotland: the challenge ofdevolution (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 243.
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Wales) is known as more European-friendly on issues such as the European Union or
the single currency, the Euro.
The table here and the ones above, demonstrate that the Scottish (and to some
extent the Welsh) identify rather differently in regard to their region/country/state than
the English on the one hand or the British on the other hand. The Scottish have a far
stronger identification with their ‘region’ of Scotland than the English show with their
region ‘England’. It is therefore not that surprising that the English even prefer the
idea of being British over the notion of being English.
Table 12: National identity and vote, 1992
Scottish Scottish Equally British
not more than Scottish more than
British British and British Scottish
Did not vote 16 16 13 10
Conservative 10 14 34 53
Labour 30 36 30 17
LibDem 4 11 10 12
SNP 38 22 11 5
Other 2 2 2 2
Sample size (=100%) 184 384 314 58
As anticipated, the group ‘Scottish not British’ are mentioning the SNP as their
favorite political choice, followed by Labour. Interesting in this group is further the
number the Liberal Democrats receive: just 4 per cent. If we take a look at the opposite
group ‘British more than Scottish’, the SNP is nevertheless still able to get 5 per cent,
whereas this group is overwhelmingly voting for the Conservatives (53 per cent)
followed by Labour with 17 per cent. The difficulties for the Conservatives are rooted
within these numbers.
Lynn G. Bennie and James Mitchell, 105.
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Although we do not have ‘British not Scottish’ listed, we know from the table
of ‘Scottish and British identity in Scotland’ (see above) that only 3 per cent see
themselves as more or solely British. This goes hand in hand with the total number of
respondents. Just 58 replied from that group, whereas from the two first groups with a
stronger Scottish identity a total of 568 (184 + 384) have given their political favorites.
However, and it is necessary to bear this mind: these numbers are from 1992. So even
if the third group with a total of 314 respondents is giving the Conservatives a slim
majority with 34 per cent over Labour with 30 per cent, these numbers may no longer
be accurate. First of all, obviously, there can (and was) a change in the political
landscape over the last years; secondly there can be (and was) an overall shift of the
national identity.
Going back to the table of ‘Scottish and British identity in Scotland’ from
above, there has been a shift after 1992 - a tendency towards a more Scottish identity.
Although one should exercise caution in drawing conclusions from analyzing these
statistical figures, one can assume that a decrease in the ‘Britishness’ amongst the
Scottish people and an increase of ‘Scottishness’ would affect the electoral results of
the Conservatives negatively. This assumption is supported by the electoral results
after 1992, the Tories were never again able to attract the same number of voters.
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Table 13: National identity by party identification, 1979-1999
Percentage choosing 1979 1992 1997 1997 1999
that identity among General Referendum
supporters of party Election
Sco.* 46 58 56 68 61
Conservative
Brit.* 48 38 39 32 35
Sco.* 60 74 75 89 77
Labour
Brit.* 36 23 22 11 16
Sco.* 52 64 63 78 70
Liberal Dem.
Brit.* 39 31 32 20 17
Sco.* 84 90 93 94 93
SNP
Brit.* 9 10 5 5 5
* Forced-choice ‘best identity’
Sample sizes (=100%): 1979-Cons. 205, Lab. 245, LibD. 64, SNP 68%; 1992-Cons. 250, Lab. 332,
LibD. 67, SNP 168; 1997 general election-Cons.144, Lab. 415, LibD. 96, SNP 147; 1997 referendum-
Cons. 123, Lab. 336, LibD. 51, SNP 122; 1999-Cons. 231, Lab. 625, LibD. 166, SNP 290
Data based on: Scottish Election Surveys of 1979, 1992 and 1997; Scottish Referendum Survey of
1997; Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys of 1999 and 2000.
Table 14: Party identification by national identity, 1979-1999
Distribution of party 1979 1992 1997 1997 1999
voters among General Referendum
people of named identity Election
Cons. 26 21 12 13 13
Scottish* Lab. 41 35 48 52 41
LibD. 9 6 10 7 11
SNP 16 24 22 22 25
Cons. 41 40 26 34 33
British* Lab. 36 32 42 38
38
LibD. 10 9 16 11 12
SNP 3 8 4 6 6
* Forced-choice ‘best identity’
Sample sizes (=100%) for Scottish in 1979- 365; 1992- 690; 1997 general election- 645; 1997
referendum- 572; 1999- 1,136; for British in 1979- 242; 1992- 239; 1997
general election- 177; 1997
referendum- 101; 1999- 252
-.nr j c f
Data based on: Scottish Election Surveys of 1979, 1992 and 1997;
Scottish Referendum Survey of
1997; Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys of 1999 and 2000.
125 Table originally copied from: Lindsay Paterson et al.. New Scotland.
New Politics? {Edmbwg\\\
Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 1 10 (amended with the intention of
aiding the analysis).
Table originally copied from: Lindsay Paterson, 1 1 1
(amended with the intention of aiding t
analysis).
These tables try to bring the national identity into a political context from a
different perspective. How people vote and how they see themselves in terms of their
national identity are likely to be related.
The first table examines the voters of the various parties in Scotland; the
individual is being asked which party s/he favors, given the choice between the
Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats and the SNP.
After having delivered the party of their choice, the individual is then
questioned on his or her perspective of the ‘state’ they are living in. For this purpose
the individual in this study has to make the ‘forced-choice best identity’, either
Scottish or British. This has to be taken into consideration, as the choice might
otherwise suggest that there is nothing in-between, so there is not the variety which the
Moreno-scale offers, which gives the option of ‘more Scottish than British’, ‘equal
Scottish than British’, and so on.
The table provides some striking information. The table suggests that back in
1979 the electorate of the Conservatives voters tended to be rather evenly spread out
between ‘Scottish’ with 46 per cent on the one hand and ‘British’ with 48 per cent on
the other hand, although the Conservatives have always stressed the need for the
Union and the need for ‘Britishness’. Even more, the Conservative voters have made a
surprising change over the years: already in 1992 the number of ‘Scottish’ was far
higher than the ones seeing themselves as ‘British’ (58/ 38). This trend goes even
further until 1999 (61/ 35), after having its peak in 1997 at the time of the referendum
(68/ 32).
When it comes to the SNP, the numbers are as expected. In 1979 84 per cent of
the SNP-voters feel ‘Scottish’ vs. only 9 per cent have the same feeling when it comes
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to being ‘British’. There has not been any huge change, though the ‘Scottishness’
amongst the SNP electorate has increased to 93 per cent (vs. 5 per cent of
‘Britishness’) in 1999.
The overall picture provided from this table is that all of the parties have had
an increase in the ‘Scottish’ voters between 1979 and 1999, and also all of them have
had a decrease in ‘British’ voters in the same time frame.
The second table examines the same question, but the other way round. This
time the subject is first being asked whether ‘Scottish’ or ‘British’ is their choice.
After providing this information the focus will be on the choice of the parties.
People who define themselves as ‘Scottish’ tended to vote mainly Labour,
whether it was in 1979 or in 1999. This is significant, as one might assume that the
SNP would benefit mainly from the ‘Scottish’ group. The SNP was able to gain
support from that group over the years, but again not to the extent that Labour did. The
biggest share of the ‘British’ group also goes to Labour. Labour has outnumbered the
Conservatives ever after 1992, who would have been naturally the ones who have had
the biggest support within this group. This table shows also that the Conservatives
have, as anticipated, a greater support from the ‘British’ than from the ‘Scottish’
identifiers, around three times as much in 1999 (13/ 33), but again. Labour are the
ones who get the benefits of the favorite political party amongst the Scots who see
themselves as ‘British’.
What these data suggest is that the future of politics in Scotland is mainly in
the hands of Labour. With the main support coming from ‘Scottish’ (41 per cent) and
‘British’ (38 per cent) at the same time, one might suggest that ‘Labour’ is walking a
thin line. As with any political party. Labour of course would like to have support
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from as many groups as possible. How Labour will be able to maintain the support
from both of the groups in the future without losing the ‘British’ to the Conservatives
and the ‘Scottish’ to the SNP, remains a challenge. Labour’s problem is how to serve
both at the same time, in the words of Paterson: “Labour’s dilemma is how to ride
both horses at once.”'^^
But then, and this is not recognizable from these tables, perhaps Scotland is, as
already suggested, a ‘Labour-land’ par excellence, so that the support remains,
whatever the agenda of the Labour party might be and whatever their leaders might
say or do.
Table 15: Trust in each party to work in Scotland’s interest
Conservative Labour Liberal Dem. SNP
Just about always 2 11 2 28
Most of the time 8 49 26 34
Only sometimes 31 33 42 20
Almost never 56 4 11 11
Don’t know 2 3 19 7
sample size (=100%) 674 674 674 674
The SNP, having the highest ‘just about always’ ratings are the most trusted
party when it comes to working in Scotland’s interest. The Conservatives are the ones
where just 2 per cent think that they are working in the interest of Scotland. It is also
interesting that the Liberal Democrats, who have shown to be rather ‘helpful’ and
focused back in the times of the Scottish Constitutional Convention are finding solid
solutions for Scotland are receiving such bad numbers in the poll. This assessment
becomes obvious when compared with the other parties. The work of the Liberals was
more helpful than that of the SNP (who withdrew), more than the Conservatives (who
Lindsay Paterson, 1 12.
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did not attend in the first place) and Labour (who was moving with the pace of a
sedated elephant on certain issues). Also a 19 per cent ‘don’t know’ is also a sign that
the public relations of the Scottish Liberals are not as effective as, say the SNP’s.
This chapter analyzed how national identity varies in a very wide range within
Britain. England, the dominant part of Britain, sees itself somewhat different than
Scotland and Wales within Great Britain and, of course, vice versa.
The data shows that the picture of identity in Scotland and Britain is complex.
The Scottish people have a tendency to ‘dislike the English’, which can be explained
partly by the attitude that the union brings more benefits [sic] to the English
economy. Often times the oil argument is being used to refer to the benefits gained
by the contribution of the Scottish economy to the British. These perceptions are
manifested in attitudes towards parties and constitutional change. People with a strong
Scottish identity are mainly anti-Conservative. Although Scottish identity is negatively
related to Conservative identity, the SNP is not the sole beneficiary. Supporters of all
parties prefer to see themselves as Scottish, even those who link themselves with the
Conservative party. And, Scottish identifiers do not necessarily demand separation
from Britain. Even though a Scottish, devolved parliament is the most favored
constitutional option, even those who favor a Union like pre-1997 tend to describe
themselves as Scottish, rather then British. Overall, the sense of being ‘British’ erodes
away.
If the factors on which the Scottish national identity is based on are more than a
cultural identity, but if it has also an important political dimension, then the SNP
Paula Surridge and David McCrone, “The 1997 Scottish referendum vote”, in Bridget Taylor and
Katarina Thomson, 6 1
.
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might be the main beneficiary. As the people trust the SNP most as the party which
works best in Scotland’s interest, that could be the reason why the SNP would be able
to profit from this transfer from the cultural level to the political level in the years to
come.
4. 1 . Elections to the Scottish Parliament
Finally, the question will be answered how the Scottish electorate has elected
their first parliament since the Union of 1 707.
Table 16: Electoral Representation in the Scottish Parliament - Number of Seats'^®
Scottish Parliament election 1997
Constituencv Additional Total MSP
Scottish MP’s in Westminster
year: 92 97 01
Labour 53 3 56 49 56 56
SNP 7 28 35 3 6 5
Conservative — 18 18 11 1
LibDem. 12 5 17 9 10 10
Independent 1 - 1 — — —
SSP'^' - 1 1 — — —
Green — 1 1 __ __
Total 73 + 56 129
Labour has won the elections for the Scottish Parliament, but needed to have a
coalition partner, to have a qualified majority. The coalition partner are the Liberal
Democrats, together they hold a relatively comfortable majority of a total of 73 MSP,
eight above the necessary number of 65. Ironically, if the parliament would have been
elected under the ‘first-past-the-posf system, that system the Conservatives are
Lynn G. Bennie and James Mitchell, 140.
National Statistics, Britain 2000 (London: The Stationary Office, 1999)
SSP: Scottish Socialist Party
90
holding on so desperately, they would have had not one single seat. Second biggest
power is the SNP, it holds the title: ‘Official Opposition’.
/
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CHAP T ER 5
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion this thesis has sought to provide the reader with insight into
changes within Scotland over the past few decades with regard to its attitude towards
the nation-state of Great Britain and the United Kingdom. That Scotland today is a
different place from its recent history is obvious. The changes of identity that occurred
in the 1960s and 1970s are commonly linked to the decline in Britain’s economy. But
also the discovery of oil in the North Sea should not be underestimated. Suddenly
independence would make sense and could even be financially rewarding. When those
two factors are combined, it is not a surprising that many Scots were suddenly starting
to question the status of their nation within Britain. That the Scottish National Party,
based on their slogan It 's Scotland’s Oil, got over 30 per cent of the overall vote in the
elections of 1974, can be seen as the best proof for these changes in the minds of
Scottish men and women.
Despite the fact that the referendum of 1979 failed, it should not be concluded
that there was then any decline in the sense of a separate Scottish identity for the
people of Scotland, or a diminishing demand for a devolved parliament.
The reasons behind the failure of the 1979 devolution referendum have both
mundane and practical roots. Mundane in that they are a reflection of the lack of
regard afforded at the time the government to address that issue effectively, and thus
punishment by the electorate on issues like economy. The practical reasons for the
failure are tied up in the 40 per cent rule of votes in favor required by the
overall
electorate.
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That the Labour backbencher’s diluted the Scotland Act of 1979 to such an
extent that it was almost unlikely to succeed, as well as the overall half-heartedness of
the Labour party in supporting the referendum is an irony of history. However, the
even greater irony was that the Scottish people, by punishing the Labour government,
brought the government down and opened up the gates for Thatcher and the
Conservatives. That the SNP was the party which defeated the Labour government and
was therefore the reason for new elections, is also highly ironic. Had the SNP not
voted against the government, the Conservatives might have not gained power and the
Scottish people would have never had to live with Thatcher and her party. This is truly
hypothetical, and as general elections were nevertheless due to take place in 1979, this
outcome might not have changed a great deal if the SNP had indeed supported the
government.
The realization that a ‘no’ (or ‘not enough’) vote had been a mistake the people
of Scotland became fully aware of Thatcher’s politics. The years of ‘Thatcherism’ and
the implications of these policies stood directly against the overall political perception
of the Scottish people. Left-leaning and Labour-voting as the Scottish people are,
Thatcher could be seen to embody a position directly opposite. The number of Scottish
Conservative MP’s fell steadily and the 1997 general election, providing a landslide
victory for New Labour, was the all-time low for the Tories. At that point the
Conservative party was decimated, not only in Scotland, but there especially so.
Having not one single seat left in Scotland, nor in Wales, made the Tories a regional
party.
When Tony Blair and the Labour party came to power, he began to build upon
the proposals of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, which has set out the
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guidelines of a devolved parliament. That the Scottish Constitutional Convention was
so successful is to some extent explainable through the support of the Scottish people
and the Scottish media. When the Conservatives had been in power, the Convention
offered an appropriate alternative for the day when a Labour government would be
elected and could support these proposals.
The views expressed by the people on the subject of devolution and
independence are varied. The Unionist view might be “as soon as the state gets into
some trouble, the Scots leave the sinking ship,” whereas the nationalist might say that
“too long we have stayed in a union which has not committed itself in finding
appropriate answers to our problems, we are going our way.” Both viewpoints have a
valid point. The evidence of the 1960s and 1970s tend to give support to the unionist
view. The economy is in decline, and instead of working together with the English and
the Welsh, the Scots seek devolution or independence.
Nevertheless, one could get the impression that as long as the Union brought
benefits to Scotland, the Scots were satisfied, but as soon as that changed and the
Union was no longer a guarantee for jobs, a prospering economy and growth, the Scots
started to become dissatisfied. The 1960s and 1970s tend to support the Unionist view
based on the fact that the British Empire in the decades and centuries before was
deemed to be good for Scotland.
That Thatcher presented the Scots with every justification for demanding a
change in the status of the Union is unquestioned. Eighteen years of Thatcher-rule
provided the Scottish people with a lasting impression about her, the Tories and the
region in which the Tories operate most successfully: England. When the Tories lost
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every single constituency seat in Scotland and Wales, it did not take long for a good
number of Scots to make the connection between Tories equals England. More and
more Scottish people were just not able to rely on the English in their ability to elect a
reasonable party to govern the United Kingdom. The Conservatives were seen by a lot
of Scots as not reasonable. The dominance of England over Scotland and Wales
demonstrated to the Scottish electorate that their votes are worthless. If in the end,
England makes the decision regarding who should be the one to govern the state and if
now and again England has fundamentally different criteria than Scotland, it would
not take long until the people start to demand a form of self-government or even
independence. Based on that, the sense of Scottish identity which people experienced
began to rise and manifest itself in part in a greater, more vocal demand for a devolved
parliament.
When one enters a supermarket these days, it is unavoidable to observe
responses to the changes of our understanding of the term cultural identity which have
taken place within the last few years and are now presented for us on the supermarket
shelves. Many products are no longer “made in Britain,” rather they are now “made in
Scotland.” National identity might manifest itself in strange forms, and in the case of
Scotland, the dairy products are more sellable when coming from Scottish cows rather
than from British cows, which could mean that they were in reality English. The bags
one is given in which to carry the groceries, now carry logos such as: “Sainsbury (a
British company) - proud to serve Scotland,” positioned underneath an image of the
Scottish flag. Tea sells better if it is the ‘Scottish’ blend, still made in countries like
95
Indis., but blended for the special Scottish tap water.” On average, one would have
difficulty in finding any meat that is not “made in Scotland”.
But it is not only supermarkets which highlight such evidence of change,
although not officially allowed, quite a number of license plates on cars carry the
symbol of the European Union and simultaneously underneath state: “Sco” for
Scotland.
It goes further. The driving license in the United Kingdom, a model based upon
the European Union, states on line no. 3 the place of birth. Rather than stating a city, it
now says Scotland, England, or, if one prefers, the United Kingdom.
The future will show in which direction the identity of the Scottish people will
head. If such a sense of national Scottish identity continues to intensify at the same
pace as it has done in the past few years, and if it is simultaneously connected to a
concomitant demand to be expressed politically and constitutionally, then devolution
must eventually lead to more powers for the parliament and perhaps even a greater
demand for independence. Already today there are many Scots who believe that it is
likely that their nation will become independent in the next twenty years.
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Table 17: Expectations of independence, 1999
‘At any time in the next twenty years, do you think it is likely or unlikely that Scotland
will become completely independentfrom the United Kingdom? ’
Very likely 19
Quite likely 41
Quite unlikely 25
Very unlikely 16
Sample size (=100%) 638
Table 18: Attitude towards independence, 1979, 1999'^^
1979 1999
view of column support for column support for
independence
(%)
independence
(% in cell) (%)
independence
(% in cell)
very bad 21 0 14 3
bad 33 0 31 6
good 21 16 33 45
very eood 8 40 12 77
sample size 729 1482
The question in both years was 'If Scotland did become independent some time in the future, do you
think that this would be a very bad thing... etc.
Don’t know and not answered included in the base.
This call for independence can be directly linked to national identity. A
demand for the contemporary parliament was based on that and the future of Scotland
will therefore also be based on the demand provided by identity. For the Scottish
people to pursue the historical step from devolution to independence could potentially
require very little in the way of leverage. A repeat of the experience of a politician like
Thatcher in Whitehall, or even a majority of Tories in parliament, could be reason
enough.
At the time of submitting this thesis (March 2003), the political scene within
Great Britain is highly divided with regard to the firm commitment of the government
Taken from; Alice Brown et al.. The Scottish electorate: the 1997 general election and beyond,
(New York: Palgraye Macmillan, 1999), 147.
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to support a United States led was against Iraq. The vast majority of the British
electorate is strongly opposed to Tony Blair’s stance in support of a military
campaign, especially if it not supported by the United Nations. The month of February
2003 has seen the biggest demonstrations in the history of Great Britain with up at
least one million people marching in London against the prospect of war.
Simultaneously we have seen the biggest Labour rebellion in history against the
leadership. A grand-breaking 122 Labour MPs voted against the government (with
other parties making a total of 199 MPs). With elections coming up in Scotland on 1
May 2003, Labour might well find themselves losing a substantial number of seats in
the Scottish Parliament. Suddenly it seems feasible that the SNP, if they are able to
project themselves as the anti-war party representing the views of Scottish people on
this issue, might gain a considerable amount of seats. Even though Labour is trying
desperately to keep the war out of the election campaign, as it is a ‘reserved matter.’
However, many people might reconsider their vote to show their concern with a
potential war. Nevertheless, elections are in a little over five weeks from now, and the
outcome of the war might change this current situation totally.
To sum up, the constitutional situation of the Scottish people has changed very
much after the establishment of the parliament. However, devolution in Great Britain
seems to be linked to the national identity. If the overall number of people feel more
‘Scottish’ today than 20 years ago, and if national identity is turning into nationalism
by some of the Scottish people, it seems likely that in some years from now Scotland
will be asked whether it would prefer to be independent.
Scottish Affairs, No. 40, Summer 2002.
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